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Productivity growth in the United States has taken a down-
ward trend since the nation entered the decade of the 60s. This
issue is contemporary because its consequences are apparent in
every American industry. Government, business and individuals
are equally affected because prices continue to escalate.
Hence, the cost of living appears to be unmanageable. Several
factors have contributed to the slump in United States produc-
tivity growth. The most important of these factors are low ca-
pital investment, strained management and labor relationships,
insufficient research and development spending, low employee
motivation, the attitude of organized labor unions, lack of
national commitment, high government spending and the general
managerial philsophies.
There are six parts to this thesis: the first deals with
definitions and concepts, historical review, and the nature of
the United States economy, the second presents productivity
trends by sector, the third entails comparative productivity
trends of the U.S. and Japan. The fourth section presents the
effects of other major factors on productivity including man-
agement - labor relations, the energy crisis, and a detailed
analysis of U.S. managerial processes. The fifth section deals
with present and future produtivity trends, and the final sec-
tion gives conclusions and recommendations.
This thesis presents a descriptive analysis of the causes
of the United States productivity slump. Historical information
is used to make significant comparisons where necessary. The
objective of this thesis in its various parts, is to present
facts surrounding the United States productivity decline in the
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CHAPTER I 
Definitions and Concepts 
Productivity is defined by dictionaries from many perspec-
tives. Some define it as the degree of effectiveness of indus-
trial management especially the effectiveness in utilizing la-
bor and equipment. Others look at it as the ability or capa-
city to produce in abundance or richness in output. whatever
definition there is, the key words around which productivity is
built are effective utilization of labor, equipment and capital
for efficient production. It is the key determinant of a na-
tion's future growth.
Productivity, which is a ratio of output to input, can
also be measured in different ways. For instance, it may be
computed as a ratio of output to capital, or to labor, or to a
combination of the two. Historically, the measure of produc-
tivity which is most commonly used has been output per unit of
labor input, frequently referred to as "labor productivity."
This measure reflects not only the labor's effort but also
other factors, such as the state of technology, capital per
worker, availability of materials, the efficiency of manage-
ment, and the rate of operations.
The output part of a labor productivity ratio may also be
defined in several ways. The simplest and most common way is
what is called physical output, where the components are physi-
cal units such as pounds, bushels, numbers, etc. The arithmetic
average of the productivity change of any of these components
can be measured by weighing the units by man hours or the clos-
est equivalent, such as labor cost.
There are also broad aggregates, such as manufacturing or
the total private economy and these aggregates are constructed
in terms of another concept called net output. Purchased "in-
termediate" products consumed in the production process are
excluded. 1
This type of measure is relation to man hours reflects not
only the average of the individual productivity changes, but
also reflects shifts in the relative importance of low-or high-
productivity industries as well as saving in materials inputs.
Pragmatically, productivity is a mission of every respon-
sible organization be it profit or nonprofit in nature. It is a
very huge subject which encompasses the entire economy of a
nation and it affects everyone indiscriminagely. To the genera-
lists which consists of legislators, educators and corporate
businessmen, productivity strands as taxes, government poli-
cies, capital, access to resources, adequacy of labor and man-
agement, competitors, and the frequent flow of goods and ser-
vices.
Special - interest groups such as union and industry lead-
ers have their own perspective. In most cases these groups po-
sition themselves on the opposite side of any productivity is-
1
The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to Present.
By Fairfield Publisher, Inc. (Connecticut: 	 Fairfield Pub. 1969), p. 593
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sue. Conservationists and consumerists will direct their atten-
tion to other facets of the same issue, while parties and is-
sues can be further fractioned by divergent views from regional
or political factions.
When productivity is viewed from the perspective of a sin-
gle organization, be it a factory, government agency, or a ser-
vice unit, many of the opposite opinions are excluded. In such
instances cause and effect relationships are more visible and
more urgent. In organizations managers coordinate input with
output to meet certain schedules and predetermined objectives.
They are constrained to buy technology and within budgetary
limits. Their search for efficiencies never ceases and they
perceive productivity improvement as a duty of their office,
even though this duty is less imparative than the drive for
maximum profitability.
For the individual workers, basically concerned with their
immediate occupations and livelihood, productivity may even be
viewed from a narrower perspective. To them, productivity means
sharp tools, materials being available, knowing what is expect-
ed of them and what to expect in return and some supportive
environment. These anticipations apply to workers at all
levels, but the fulfillment of each anticipation actually de-
pends on individual situation. For instance, an office boy and
a janitor may share equal motivation and yet they may suggest
entirely different paths toward productivity improvement, ie.,
3
both of them view productivity from different perspectives.
It is obvious to expect different vis and be able to
diagnose each one. These divergent in views make the pursuit of
productivity challenging and frequently frustrating. There are
chances of winning and without being intimidated by the result-
ing complexity, we should bear in mind that there is never a
one-shot solution. There is no all-purpose productivity prin-
ciple developed as yet and no intellectual to point out a prov-
en way. However, there is a wealth of productive practices
thaat can be seened to reveal those that conform to each per-
spective.
Sometimes it is easier to understand something by realiz-
ing exactly what it is not. Most often productivity is categor-
ized with patriotism and motherhood as being obviously worthy.
It obvious is, but there are some skeptisms. Both boosters and
detractors tend to magnify its virtures and its faults and to
some degree productivity gains do not necessarily increase pro-
fit. A product or service can be produced with less input and
still be a money loser if no customer wants to purchase it
Equally so, little is accomplished by boosting the productivity
of one segment of a process when the gain cannot be passed a-
long simply because the next segment is not prepared for it.2
Such situation will definitely become constraint on product-
ivity and as such we can say that an unplanned productivity
growth can be unproductive. And when a higher level of output
2
James L. Riggs and Glenn H. Felix, Productivity by Objectives (Englewood, N.J.
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1983), pp. 2-5
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is achieved by disproportionately increasing the input, produc-
tivity actually declines. Producing more products with the same
input is a gain only when the quality level is maintained
steadily. If you sacrifice quality in order to boost quantity
of output, value of output seldom increases. Hence, productivi-
ty is a measure of value.
There is an adhesive relationship between productivity and
employment. It is evident on one side that a job is forfeited
whenever a labor saving change eliminates a position. On the
other side is evidence that more productive industries. From
this relationship one can say that reducing a company's labor
force by 10 percent may save the jobs of the other 90 percent,
but such rationalization will be unsound to those employees who
may be dropped from the payroll. From a management perspective
it is both humane and economically defensible for managers to
avoid productivity - induced layoffs through retraining, relo-
cation, or retention until natural attrition provides an open
ing. This actually portrays the fact that a pledge of job se-
curity is the conscience of productivity movement. In other
words, the more secured an employee feels about his job the
more willing he is to enhance productive methods.
Productivity requires total firm commitment but nearly
every organization gives lip service to it. The more progres-
sive or more desperate ones usually back their words with re-
5
sources that are totally dedicated to the productivity more-
ment. In the case where money is scare, the backing can take
the form of sharing authority and encouraging innovative act-
ions. Strong leadership from the top down to the bottom also
creates a conducive atmosphere from which improvement can flow
with minimal financial support.
There seems to be no true substitute for vigorous support
from above and creative leadership can build the framework for
productivity growth anywhere. Sometimes worker-involvement
teams are developed in single departments, but their contribu-
tion to productivity may be unnoticed by other departments
within the same organization. A good leader, however, can stir
a group of workers toward spectacular performance, but this is
harder to do without topside backing and it will increase em-
ployee satisfaction of accomplishment.
Credit for a productivity gain should be owed to many
sources. The people who are responsible to foster the gain and
the capital that will nourish it definitely deserve a share of
the credit. Customers who will purchase the products or ser
vices should not be overlooked and prudent management suggests
that those directly responsible for the gain be rewarded first
in order to promote continuing improvement. As such, the cus-
tomers should receive a share by means of price reductions,
which is not a welfare gesture toward the customers because low
prices increase demand in a competitive market. A company can
6
then supply more of its products to the market if it offers
lower prices. The additional goods can be supplied by the same
work force through its higher productivity, thus employment is
relatively stable or even rising, and the customers enjoy
stable or declining prices.
Prices for products or services from the more productive
industries are normally held steady or may change slightly over
a long period of time. It is worth noting that sharply inflated
prices are associated with less productivity growth and this
phenomenon emerges in every country.
Productivity is also affected by many factors including
fiscal policy, political decisions both at home and abroad,
resource shortages and consumer's spending. Whenever wage in-
creases exceed gain in production efficiencies, the goods or
services produced from labor and capital will inevitably become
more expensive. Competitiveness will be lost in the marketplace
and a dollar buys less in quantity.
The long term effect of declining productivity is even
more disturbing than immediate inflation. A drop in produc-
tivity actually means more resources are being consumed to pro-
duce just the same output as before. Less output then becomes
available per individual and the scramble to maintain the share
one has grown accustomed to becomes habitual. It is a struggle
to improve our individual status and at most times expectations
are dimmed to the extent that we realize today's children may
7
be much less prosperous than their parents. It is this rational




Historically, the United States is the envy of the world
in its remarkably high level of productivity in relation to
production. However, many of the mid - 20th century problems of
the United States stem from the nation's rate of economic
growth, ie., the rate at which production of goods and services
has increased.
In domestic affairs the growth rate has been largely cri-
tized by the public as both too rapid and not rapid enough. The
issue has become controversial and there seems to be no consen-
sus as yet. People who consider the growth rate too rapid seem
to look at it as the cause of certain strains of adjustment
such as the technological displacement of skilled employees and
the depression of particular industries and areas. And those
who consider it too slow have attributed their reasons to the
persistently high unemployment especially in the late 1950's.
In the 1960's, the public became concerned that perhaps the
economy is not able to expand jobs fast enough to keep up with
the increased numbers of youth seeking their first jobs. More
recently we have seen price inflation which is largely asso-
ciated with the war in Vietnam and this inflation has plagued
the nation because spending has grown faster than the ability
to produce.
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On the international level the United States has been fac-
ed with problems. Firstly it has been deeply concerned with
accelerating its own growth rate in order to keep ahead of
rival industrial nations such as Japan, and second is the con-
cern of helping poor nations to also get ahead on their own
path of rapid growth. After recovering from World War II,
Russia, Japan and other European nations have continued to grow
faster than the United States and these countries have provided
more competition in world markets. Some poor nations have even
been tempted to look to communist nations for leadership to the
path of rapid progress due to America's lagging growth. These
poor nations are also seeking material assistance and good ad-
vice on how to raise their own production levels. Not only have
there been no quick ways to raise the path of rapid national
expansion, but also advisors often have found the problems of
initiating rapid growth in underdeveloped nations strange and
sometimes worthless.
These problems have stimulated new interest in the growth
experience of the United States and it is hoped that it will be
a little wiser in dealing with its own growth problems and giv-
ing guidance to other nations as well. This does not mean past
experience can be repeated or it can be applied as an exact
guide in the future. However, there is a growing body of new
information and new interpretations about America's growth and
the intelligent citizen today needs some insight into the pro-
1 0
blems as well as some acquaintance with these new ways of look-
ing at the United States economy.
It is no great surprise to most Americans to learn that
their nation has the highest consumption level among all na-
tions of the world. Most of them have long taken for granted
that the United States is the first ranking industrial nation
of the world. What most of these people have failed to realize
especially those who have not traveled abroad, is just how far
ahead of other industrial nationals are the United States in-
comes. Second is to find out how desperately low are incomes in
the poor nations. The clothing, automobiles, homes, personal
possessions, and incomes that Americans take for granted seem
fabulous to people of other nations who view American moves and
or see American tourists. It is difficult for them to realize
for instance, the only six percent of the world's population,
Americans have over half of the world's telephone and automo-
biles. 3 These items are imported to the United States which
implies an imbalance between United States import and export
rates.
In order to make more meaningful internationl compari-
sions, it is better to begin with family income comparisions in
the United States. This is a measure that is seemingly compar-
able to personal income and its more familiar to most
Americans. Reports from the 1960 census revealed that the me-
dian family income was $6,845 at that time. If all families
3
John M. Peterson and Ralph Gray, Economic Development of The United States 
(Homewood: 	 Illinois, Richard Irwin, Incf, 1969), p. 4f
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were ranked by income level and then dividing them into five
equal groups, one-fifth of the families with the highest rank-
ing incomes would average more than double the national median.
And the one-fifth of the families with the lowest ranking in-
comes would average a little less than one- fourth of the na-
tional median.
From this scenario, then, what do people in the United
States refer to as "poor"? The term "poverty" has been fre-
quently applied to family incomes below $3,000, but this is
rather arbitrary. If families in the United States average any-
where between three and four persons in the lowest fifth of all
families, then their average income will come to about $400 to
$500 per person.
Compared to the other industrial nations, the United
States was far above in GNP per capita in 1960. There are wide
variations among the underdeveloped nations and for some of the
poorest nations, the GNP per capita is below one twentieth of
the United States average.4 And because most of these lowest
income nations are heavily populated, roughly half of the
people in the world during 1960 lived on an income below $100 a
year, which is less than $2.00 a week. In any case therefore,
the United States is ranking above most nations of the world in
terms of per capita income.
The beginning of the economy of the United States is cha-
racterized by three facts. The first is that the eastern coast
4Ibidf, pf 7.
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of America was settled initially as a European pioneer colony.
Second, its colonial culture and institutions were greatly in-
fluenced by the advanced stages of European transition from a
medieval traditional economy to a modern market economy. Third,
its national status started with a well-developed market eco-
nomy at the very beginning of the industrial era.
Europe was in the late stages of a transition when the
American colonies were settled. At that time the traditional
economy (cooperation through exchange) was already giving way
to a market economy. In America there was no struggle to over
throw a ruling class and so most individuals were attracted by
natural opportunities and were forced to become self-reliant
and adaptive.5
At the time the United States was found it begun with a
fully developed market economy and that was when the Industrial
Revolution was in its early stages. This means the United
States started at an advanced stage of development with a high
degree of readiness to begin industrialization and rapid eco-
nomic growth. The nation begun as an agricultural nation highly
specialized in export crops such as wheat, corn, etc. and was
actively engaged in world commerce. It was equipped with insti-
tutions, leadership, skills, and wealth required to launch its
own development.
The market economy was not invented by an individual. It
arose gradually out of the activities of many Europeans even
5 Ibidf, pf 37
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long before national governments were formed and before anyone
quite understood it. Economists merely begun to describe how it
worked and from that point they gave it a name "Capitalism".6
The acquiring of political independence by the United
States did not bring about immediate economic independence, nor
did it bring immediate progress in the living standards. The
American economy remained predominantly agricultural and close-
ly tied to European markets and the chief commercial crops had
still to be sold abroad, while most manufactured goods were
imported. The level of per capita income at the time was depen-
dent upon production for trade and prospects for raising per
capita income were closely tied to the fortunes of trade.7 With
this type of trade practice there was no advantage whatsoever
in seeking to make the United States immediately self-suffi-
cient. Therefore movements toward self-sufficiency were sus-
pended during this period and every effort was geared toward
export trade.
The United States economy was actually not ready to become
a modern industrialize economy at the very end of the Revolu-
tionary War in 1783. Although it started with a relatively high
income consumer market, an active commercial class, and politi-
cal institutions all of which were favorable to business enter-
prise, it needed at least half a century more before becoming
ready for rapid industrialization. There was enough natural
resources available at the time, but they had to be combined
7Ibid, pf 141
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with an adequate supply of labor and capital. Knowledge of how
best to combine these resources was also needed. Rapidly ac-
celerated per capita growth begun in the United States just
prior to the Civil War of 1860.
The rate of United States economic expansion and rise in
productivity after the Civil War was great and manufacturing by
then provided the main stimulus to this rapid increase. Between
1860 and 1913, the share of world manufacturing production in
the United States rose from 23 to 36 percent. After 1913
America's manufacturing output along was equal to the combina-
tion of its three nearest rivals - France, England and Germany.
American productivity and manufacturing capacities begun to
grow rapid around 1840, but the Civil War caused heavy damages
and during that period efforts were directed toward arms pro-
duction which retarded investments in every sector of the eco-
nomy. The Civil War apparently interrupted the growth rate of
total production but shortly therefore, total production fully
recovered and underwent the most rapid rate of increase in
American economic history.
The fast rate of growth in output than the increase in
inputs definitely suggests that something more than mere expan-
sion happened. Improvements in both the method and organization
of production must have taken place. An increase in productivi-
ty is commonly used as a measure of the results of such im-
provement. Estimates showed that three decades prior to 1920,
15
capital input in the private sector of the United States eco-
nomy increased at a yearly average rate of 3.4 percent and that
of labor input increased to 2.2 percent.8 The combination of
labor and capital inputs therefore increased at therate of 2.8
percent per year and total output rose by 3.9 percent which
gave a total factor productivity ratio increase of 1.3 percent
annually.
Two important things should be clearly noted from these
increases. The first is that an increasing amount of capital
was being used per worker in order to attain the rising output
per worker. Second, output was increasing faster than either
the labor input or the capital input. Improvement in methods
and organization, therefore, were surely the forces behind this
combination of inputs to produce more output. Labor at the time
accounted for more than three quarters of the total cost of
production, but capital was contributing more to the increase
in productivity because new methods usually require investment
in more capital in the form of new types of machinery and
equipment.
The assumption frequently hed by peopleis that modern
industrial progress was achieved in the United States at the
expense of workers. It is also believed that property owners
transferred the gains in productivity for themselves and pro-
fits were obtained partly by reducing the real wage income of
workers. Some of these beliefs may not hold in all cases be-
8Ibidf, pf 257
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cause while an increasing proportion of capital was used in
production from 1889 to 1919, it was estimated that the averge
unit price of capital increased much more slowly than did the
unit price of labor. This means real income attained by capital
owners increased less rapidly than income earned by labor.
With the close of the Civil War the industrial development
of the United States increased tremendously and productivity
reached its peak. Productive economic developments continued to
advance, almost without interruption. Immediately following the
war factory system was fully established and manufactures de-
veloped to a point that gave the United States the undisputed
industrial leadership of the world.9 Industry and commerce were
heavily helped by accumulations of capital and labor advanced
to power formerly unheard of, which later resulted in problems
in the relationship between employers and employees. The con-
cept of finance also played an increasingly important part in
politics and in the minds of the people.
Although relationship between employers and employees has
been strained for the past few decades due to organized labor
movements, there has been a continuing increase in the effi-
ciency of the employed. In the post World-War II period studies
showed that the Americans experienced increases in output per
unit of labor much higher than those in England. The produc-
tivity of labor in American industry was also over twice as
great per man as productivity in British industry. Several fao-
9
Edward Sf Cowdrick, Industrial History of the United States (New York:
Ronald Press Co., 1923, pf 191f
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tors were responsible for the difference. First was the greater
degree of standardization and specialization in America than
was in Britain. Second, American industry was characterized by
better planning and supervision of productionf Finally, the
American workers seemed to have been more productive because
of their attitude toward their jobs. They were more interested
in their jobs and seemed in general to have been more willing
worker than workers in Britain.
18
NATURE OF UNITED STATES ECONOMY
The United States economy can best be studied by first
taking a closer look at capitalism, what it is and what it
does. In the United States there are huge corporations and
well-established business enterprises and at times people won-
der just how these establishments came to being. For instance,
a manufacturing company needs materials, machinery, equipment
and technical knowledge to operate efficiently. It also re-
quires an enormous amount of labor and probably some means of
transporting its materials and supplies. All the workers who
contribute, directly and indirectly, to its productive opera-
tion must be fed, housed, clothed and amused; otherwise they
cannot work neither can they be induced to work. What then isit
that makes such things posible within the American economy
system? What single force creates it all? The answer is the ma-
gical powers of capitalism, as strong in the economic world
today as gravitation in the physical.1°
This capitalism is the power of stored money and hundred
of millions of dollars go into United States businesses each
year. Hundreds of billions are expended on factories, mills,
railways and machinery, and without this capital, in some form,
the vast industries of the United States, as those of the rest
of the world, could not have come into existance. In the con-
1 °Carl Snyner, Capitalism the Creator (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941),
pf 121
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struction of these factories, mills and railways, these bil-
lions must be provided in order to sustain the workers who are
employed. This is an economic phenomenon which holds in every
nation whether it has a free economy as in the United States,
or a compulsory economy, as in Russia.
The industries in the United States are not imaginative or
mere fantasy of capitalism. The capital required to build them
for economic activities has to come from some place. For the
most part, the capital for United States industrial enterprises
comes from the few who divert part of their income from con-
sumption to investment. Apparently their function is to collect
the funds that create the capital equipment of this country,
which makes possible the huge products and services.
It is absolutely essential to note here that if economic
progress should be achieved in any nation, then someone has to
provide the required capital. The capital could be provided by
the state or an economic class within it. However, within the
state there is usually no class which insures the most effec-
tive use of such funds. As for the politicians and officials,
they are rarely men of high business ability, and still more
important, they have no imperative interest in either efficien-
cy or profit.11 In a society of free enterprise the mechanism
that attain all these ends is capitalism.
The great wealth of the United States is due almost wholly
to the growth of manufacturing, mining, transportation and
11
Ibidf, pp. 121 - 122
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trade with little attributed to agriculture. This tremendous
industrial growth has required sufficient supply of new capi-
tal, without which invention, discovery, and enterprise would
have been inefficient. This new capital is derived directly
from the industries themselves, with each industry providing
its own capital through reinvestment. Individual savings has
also contributed to this capital, but on a very small scale.
The supply of capital comes from the profits of the in-
dustries, the accumulation of which is due to the energy and
initiative ideas of highly capable individuals with talents for
efficient management. As the wealth and income of these indivi-
duals grow from time to time, greater amount of capital is
pumped into the system for industrial expansion and the crea-
tion of new industries.
The powers and potential of the United States industries
stem from the fact that its economy system is a mixed one. It
is capitalistic, government regulated and its model is the
price system. The market system is determined by the supply and
demand of goods and services, and those who produce the goods
and services most desire by the society survive. The distribu-
tion of resources and growth promotion of the entire economy is
determined by free enterprise system through competition.
Private property and private enterprise are the twin
cornerstones on which the American economy system is built. The
United States heavily rely on private and profit-motivated in-
21
dividuals with productive initiatives to get its economic work
done. The vast undeveloped land and investment opportunities
relative to the labor supply is encouraging the establishment
of private enterprises in every sector of the United States
economy. An environment of personal freedom protected by po-
litical institutions and a legal system that recognizes private
property rights, made the search for private gain a logical and
acceptable basis for American economic growth.12 Government
and business roles are so intertwined such that the survival of
large firms that would otherwise collapse if left to their own
devices has been assumed as government responsibility. This is
one important idea that makes the American economy a dynamic
one, ie., government encourages economic development initia-
tives. However increasing government is participating, most
decisions about what and how much to produce are made by pri-
vate individuals and companies, rather than by the state. These
private individuals and companies exercise ownership rights and
generally buy or sell them without permission from the govern-
ment; financial power is therefore concentrated in stockhold-
ings.13
Although the United States has a free enterprise system,
Americans are always ready to turn to the government to reduce
hardships caused by market forces, or to shape market forces to
their own advantage. For the past few decades they have wit-
nessed new expansion of the role of government in economic act-
12Arthur Mf Johnson, The American Economyf (New York: Free Press - Macmillian
Pubf Cof, 1974), pf 152.
13 Ibidf, pf 158f
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ivities. Though there are relatively few areas in which govern-
ment decision have completely replaced the market place, the
impact of government policy can apparently be seen in all mar-
ket transactions. Government activity accounts, directly or
indirectly, for at least a third of the total spending in the
economy, and regulates in some fashion or another most market
activity. 14 Thus, the economy system is arranged such that
government decisions and individual choices are mixed together.
However, Americans are still in the process of determining what
the proper mix of government and private economic activity
should be.
In spite of the variety of protective schemes that have
been designed by government to guarantee greater economic se-
curity for Americans, the past five decades of American eco-
nomic history have been characterized by depression, war, un-
employment and inflation. Apart from the brief interval which
took place in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, the
American economy has been anything but stable. 15 Nevertheless,
we cannot ignore the substantial increases in output and real
income which are the characteristics of the post-war decades.
In fact today Americans enjoy a material standard of living far
above that of 1929 and this is the result of rapid economic
growth. Yet, despite this and the vast technological advance-
ments, Americans as they entered the 1980's seemed insecure
about their future just as they were in 1930.
14Roger Lf Ransom, Coping with Capitalism, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.,
1981), pf 12f
15 Ibidf, pf 146
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The problem of economic insecurity remains a national goal
which is both frustrating and perplexing. After fifty years of
economic progress it is hard to believe the notion of economic
insecurity. The situation is a confused one, probably because
the forces that produce economic insecurity today seems to be
more subtle than those that produced anxiety during the de-
pression. Incomes are at historically high levels, and most
Americans can barely record a situation in which extremely
large numbers of people were unable to find any kind of work.
Nevertheless, everyone is concerned about the United States
economic future and many Americans are apparently convinced
that the system is suffering from some kind of uneasiness which
will prevent it from meeting the challenges of the 198,0'-'s.
To account for this perceived economic uneasiness econo-
mists have detected many potential causes for the relatively
poor performance of the United States economy in the 1970's.
They have used the term "stagflation" to describe the problems,
but the term itself conveys the contradictory nature of the
economic illness with which the United States is dealing. If
the problem of a demand for goods and services which is too
large, is combined with that for goods and services to small to
promote either economic growth or inflation, a single diagnosis
is formed to describe symptons, but that also reveals some con-
fusion in the explanation of what lies at the root of the pre-
sent predicament.
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Whatever problems the economists have in diagnosing the
causes of this illness, the American people have no difficulty
in identifying the sympton which is the source of their discom-
fort. The problem of which they complain is inflation, which is
puzzling to some extent. Inflation is not a new phenomenon and
as such any economist virtually knows what causes itf To put it
very simple, inflation occurs whenever there is too much money
chasing too few goods in the economy. If for some reasons we
find it difficult to control the supply of available goods, the
control of the amount of money available within the economy can
be handled by the government. Accordingly, then, an obvious way
to check inflation is to have the government reduce the money
available for purchasing good and services. Economists have
known this for years and have even suggested a variety of gov-
ernment policies that might accomplish this end. Most of the
proposals have been tried and several have proven quite effec-
tive. Yet Americans are reluctant to apply these well-known
remedies. Therefore it seems as though inflation is been to-
lerated when in fact it could be stopped.
The cost of living is also going up in the United States
which has always been a land of abundance. Plenty of land, na-
tural resources, and raw materials have been available and the
industrial arrangements for the use of natural resources act-
ually reflects this abundance. However, that situation seems to
be changing and the current increase in the cost of living may
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be a warning that the diminishing resource base can no longer
support the rate of expansion of activities that has characte-
rized the last century.16 Therefore some institutional changes
are difinitely needed to encourage better use of these re-
sources.
In addition, there seems to be some institutional hardship
in the United States because economic institutions are just not
able to adjust to changes that are taking place in the economic
environment. The problem of inflation, which seems to captivate
the attention of almost everyone, stems from the inability or
unwillingness of firms and labor organizations to respond to
the pressures of changing market conditions. This emphasizes
the fact that the market institutions have difficulty ensuring
a full employment of resources without encouraging a signifi-
cant rate of inflation. This is the dilemma that is posed by





United States Trends in Production by Sector 
Goods Sector 
The concept of productivity is a serious concern of every
one because it entails man's efforts to raise himself from po-
verty. The record for the United States in this regard begins
mainly in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. This per-
iod is relatively brief, but it is the period and setting in
which efforts to raise productive efficiency were notably suc-
cessful. In the increase in real net national product per capi-
tal between 1889 and 1957, productivity advancement accounted
for about three-fourths. This means not only was there a gain
in the standard of living, but an increase in the quality and
variety of goods and an expansion of leisure time. There was
also increase provision in the future growth of the economy, as
well as for national security.
The goods sector of the United States economy includes
industries such as agriculture, mining, contract construction,
manufacturing, transportation, communications, public utilities
and government enterprise. The inclusion of agriculture and
government enterprise is a modified version of the sector. In
terms of economic importance, the goods sector is slightly su-
perior to the service sector. For instance, in 1961 output in
the goods sector accounted for 43.2 percent of gross national
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product, while the service sector accounted for 28.6 percent.17
The tendency for output in the service sector to grow more ra-
pidly than the goods sector was during the post-war period.
That dramatic trend was in employment, where the service sec-
tor's share rose from 40.4 percent to 54.0 percent. The decline
in agricultural activities and the growing importance of gov-
ernment accounted for a substantial part of this shift. How-
ever, the goods sector's share of labor compensation has kept
pace with the growth of employment before and after the war.
Productivity is higher in the goods sector than the ser-
vice sector of the United States economy. In 1961 output per
man in goods grew 1.7 percent faster than in service.18 This
fast output rate was the result of the inclusion of agriculture
and government enterprise as parts of the goods sector. In-
creases in both agricultural and government activities boost
economic growth within the goods sector, thus its rate of pro-
ductivity growth is relatively higher.
If both government and agriculture are excluded from the
goods sector, the situation will be quite different. The exclu-
sion of government will raise the productivity rate of the ser-
vice sector because output per man will rise more rapidly in
service industries other than government. The exclusion of
agriculture will lower the rate of productivity in goods be-
cause agriculture as an industry with low gross product per
man, will definitely become less important over time.
17 Victor Rf Fuchsf Productivity Trends in the goods and Service Sectors, 1929-61,
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964), pf 4f
18 Ibid, P. 12f
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There is a relationship between productivity and labor
quality and to define labor quality with precision is very dif-
ficult. However, a few words concerning its use may be helpful.
From casual observation it is apparent that man-hours or labor
are not always the same with respect to productivity. The ef-
fect of a given number of man-hours on output, holding tech-
nology and other inputs constant is likely to vary depending
upon such factors as the knowledge, intelligence, and strength
of the persons supplying the hours of work. These factors con-
tribute to variations in productivity if it is considered in
terms of labor quality.
For practical purposes, however, labor quality may be de-
fined as the ratio of labor input to man-hours. In the period
1929 - 1961, labor quality in the United States was approxi-
mately forty to fifty percent per annum. 19 This was the rate at
which labor compensation per man-hour in the goods sector rose
relative to the service sector. Increase in productivity fol-
lowed next because other input factors were allowed to vary
relative to the quality and man-hours of labor. It is therefore
evident that differential trands in productivity within the
goods and service sectors were the results of differential
trends in labor quality.
Several studies of industrial productivity have revealed
that there is a high correlation between changes in output and
changes in productivity especially for long period of time.
19 Ibid, pf 23f
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This correlation is simple in words, but difficult in reality.
Changes in output obviously imply changes in productivity, but
the direction of changes in productivity depends on many fac-
tors. Changes in output that will maintain a steady, or even
result to an improved quality output, definitely mean positive
productivity changes. If quality drops following changes in
output, then negative productivity changes are rather achieved.
Moreover, changes in output should necessarily be followed
by changes in demand for the product, assuming here that quali-
ty is maintained or improved. A reduction in output but with
high quality could lead to positive productivity changes be-
cause more of the product can be purchased by customers and may
be at a lower or higher price depending on the market struc-
ture. Industries in the goods sector today have obtained rapid
gains in productivity by showing declines in the relative
prices of the goods they produce. These price reductions have
resulted to increase in quantity customers need and therefore
increase in output levels.
Positive correlation between changes in output and changes
in productivity was achieved within the goods sector of the
United States economy between 1929-61. The tremendous increase
in output, which is determined by income change, changes in
taste, or even other production variables that are external to
the industries in this sector, has permitted the realization of
increased economics of scales, thus causing increased produc-
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tivity.20 This productivity gain was relatively lead by almost
every industry except contract construction and government.
Technological changes or shifts in the production function
of industries in the goods sector also contributed to its high
productivity. Most of these industries substituted skilled la-
bor for unskilled at very rapid rates. It may be that tech-
nological changes demanded such substitute and the impact was
manifested in more capital intensive industries. Productivity
trend in the goods sector may increase more than what it was up
to 1961 provided industries are willing to invest in physical
capital. This means more equipment and machinery with minimum
and highly qualified personnel to fulfill the labor need.
Service Sector 
The service sector includes wholesale and retail trade,
finance, insurance, real estate, personal services, profession-
al services, business services, and repair services. This clas-
sification is partly arbitrary because all industries provide
services. However in some industries such as education and me-
dical care, the service aspect is more readily apparent. The
service sector consists largely of industries that have not
received much attention in the past from economists interested
in productivity analysis. Some economists have suggested that
these industries typically have slow rates of technological
change, while others have agreed that the most distinguishing
characteristic of this sector is the inability of people to
20 	 . Ibid., p. 16.
31
measure its output correctly. The reason for this inaccuracy is
that the output of industries within the service sector is
rarely in physical units as it is in the goods sector. Output
is at most intangible and that makes its measurement very dif-
ficult.
The United States economy consists of two sectors - the
goods and the service sectors. The service sector is lower than
the goods in economic importance though postwar record shows
that there was a slight tendency for output in the service sec-
tor to out weigh the goods sector. The service sector could
have been economically important as does the goods sector, but
due to difficulties in measuring inputs and outputs this econo-
mic equivalence has yet to be achieved.
Between 1929 - 1961, United States productivity was low in
the service sector relative to the goods sector. The rate of
productivity growth in terms of output per man in the goods
sector was 1.7 percent per annum more rapid than in the service
sector. 21 There was of course a general decline in hours per
man immediately following the great depression, but the impact
of this decline was much more pronounced in the service sector.
Employment plays a very important role in measuring the
rate of productivity growth and economic advancement. The basic
employment concept used in the service sector is "persons engag-
ed". This includes self-employed proprietors in addition to
wage and salary workers, all of whom are classified as
21
Victor R. Fuchs, Productivity by Differences within the Service Sector 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967), p. 39.
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full-time employees.
The concept may be subject to considerable errors because
it is difficult to obtain complete coverage of the numerous of
small firms that are in service industries. The importance of
obtaining an accurate count of the self-employed is that, they
account for a significant fraction of total employment in many
of the service industries. Employment estimates from the Census
of Business for these industries are probably not as reliable
as those obtained for the goods sector or industries. This in-
accuracy has negative effects on the trends of productivity in
the service sector in that no proper account is given of labor
input and output relative to productivity.
Although the rate of productivity growth has been slow in
the service sector relative to the goods, but if service indus-
tries generally tended to show positive rates of change in out-
put per man, a serious question could be raised concerning the
practice of assuming a zero rate of change for service indus-
tries for which no convenient method of estimating output, in-
dependent of employment, has been found. If an assumed positive
rate of increase, say, one percent per annum, is applied to
these industries it could be argued that such a procedure is no
more arbitrary and perhaps even more accurate.
The relationship between industry rates of growth and out-
put per man is of particular interest especially for the ser-
vice sector. Many studies have established a significant posi-
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tive correlation between these two variables. The explanation
of the relationship usually runs in two opposite directions.
One is from productivity change to industry growth, and the
other from industry growth to productivity. The first explana-
tion is that rapid productivity growth leads to lower prices
which stimulate demand and output. The alternative explanation
is that changes in income or taste that increase demand and
output permit economics of scale and other efficiencies which
show up as higher productivity. However, these explanations are
mostly confined to or are dominated by industries within the
goods sector. Therefore for the most part little is known about
productivity growth rate in the service sector, especially for
those industries with no practical method for measurement.
The degree of capital usage in both sectors had a signifi-
cant impact on variations between the rate of productivity
growth. Looking at differences between the two sectors, I can
arrive at numerous assumptions in order to reach to some degree
of comparability between 1929 and 1960. From the speculative
nature of some of these assumptions, it does seem that the
goods sector had more capital per worker in 1960 than did the
service sector. The sector ratio of capital per worker between
the two sectors was roughly two to one. The goods industry was
also more capital intensive, especially in 1929, though not to
the same extent. The Internal Revenue Services data suggest
that the sector differential in growth rate of capital input
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per worker may have been of the order 50 to 60 percent per an-
num, with most of the differential occuring after 1947. This
implies that output per man was always greater in the goods
sector.
It is worth noting that accountants measure elements of
organizational profits quite well, but they ignore costs like
pollution and depletion of limited resources which have little
or no effect on profits. They normally assume that these costs
should be ignored because they are dumped on people. The pro-
duction of goods and services for people are among the objec-
tives of organizations, but neither financial accountants nor
cost accountants measure productivity for people. Instead, they
assume that every dollar of an organization's revenue or pro-
fits represents values delivered or values added. Increasing
productivity in terms of such measurement is realistically ap-
plicable to goods but not service industries. When the process
of measurement is difficult to standardize, measurement of the
rate of productivity growth in the service sector becomes a
problem.
Productivity of service organizations can be calculated as
the product of four operating functions - input, processing,
output or follow-up, and timing and coordination. If I assume
an arbitrary rating of seventy percent for each function, the
productivity will be twenty-four percent gross for any service
industry. This is calculated simply as .70 x .70 x .70 x .70.
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Consider a simple example by assuming that thirty percent
of those admitted to a state mental hospital do not actually
require hospitalization but could rather be better if treated
as outpatients. Function one, input, would then have gross ra-
ting of seventy percent. Assume that over crowding and under-
staffing will delay psychiatric attention, restrict therapy,
and limit patient counseling. Obviously lack of skills, under-
standing or even caring for these patients will further reduce
effective treatment. Function two, processing, might therefore
have a lower rating say fifty percent. At this point it is ap-
parent that only seventy out of one hundred patients should be
in the hospital and only half of the seventy can be helped. In
order words, through function two, thirty-five patients can be
effectively taken care of and so a productivity measurement of
thirty-five percent gross is attainable, ie .70 x .50.
The arithmetic as you can see is simple when it is accept-
ed that there are indeed four related operating functions which
must be equally appraised to determine the productivity of any
service industry or organization. However, conventional mea-
surements tend to constrict the views of people to one function
only. For instance, cost per inpatient in a mental hospital
constricts analysts' views to the processing function and ig-
nores the input function (who is being processed), the output
or follow-up function (what happens to those being processed),
and the timing and coordination function (when processing and
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other functions actually take place). To view the productivity
of a service organization from one function only is to deny its
goals and objectives. When conventional productivity measure-
ment is applied to single function of the service industry, it
implies that it doesn't matter what is accomplished as long as
it is done at minimum cost. And as the scenario has clearly
indicated, if any one of the four operating functions has a
zero rating, productivity is obviously zero.
Productivity means efficiency in organizations and effec-
tiveness in accomplishing organizational objectives. For the
goods sector effectiveness is assumed to be controlled in the
competitive marketplace where goods sell only if they are effec-
tive in meeting consumer preferences, needs, and demands. For
service organizations, however, effectiveness is not con-
trollable in the marketplace, and there are a number of reasons
for that.
First, when an industry in the goods sector adjusts pro-
duction to meet consumer preferences, that industry does so on
an aggregate basis in response to aggregate demand for the pro-
duct. But for the service sector there must be individual re-
sponses to individual service needs. Second, there is a diffe-
rence of power between large service organizations and indivi-
duals who need services. Usually personnel in service organi-
zations act as "gatekeepers of society", with power to exclude
individuals who displease them from society as a whole.22
22Herbert Heaton, Productivity in Service Organizational , (New York: Mc Graw-
Hill, Inc., 1977), p. 174.
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Third, compulsions like compulsory school attendance surpress
the voices of individual needs instead of meeting them as the
goods sector.
Productivity means fruitful, fertile, and creative. An
organization being productive means it is accomplishing or ac-
hieving its objectives. Productivity in service organizations
involves both the efficiency with which resources are used and
the effectiveness of services rendered. Although most indus-
tries in the goods sector use profits in a competitive market-
place as method for measuring productivity, multiple measure-
ments could be used since measurements actually control objec-
tives and results. For instance, if emphasis is heavily placed
on output per working hours as the principle measurement of
productivity, the consequence will be displacement of people
from organizations and then organizational effectiveness will
be ignored, at least in the service sector.
Capital 
For the past few years there has been a growing concern
about whether the United States will engage in a high enough
level of investment in order to assure continued growth in pro-
ductivity and high levels of employment. The negative trend in
productivity of the early 1970's and the very large employment
requirements needed at the time to reduce unemployment, espe-
cially of the mid 1970's and to provide for a growing labor
force further emphasized this concern. The disordered financial
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markets in 1972 through 1974 even gave rise to further ques-
tions about the ability of United States financial markets and
institutions to provide capital for investment outlays.
The intensity of this concern has given rise to an exten-
sive literature on what is known today as "the capital short-
age". The analysis of this issue differ in many ways as to the
extent of the problem, its causes, and the availability of so-
lutions to the problem. Some people see the problem as real and
continuously extending widely throughout the United States eco-
nomy. Others look at it as a false one or as one that is limit-
ed to specific sectors within the economy.
The capital shortage issue reflects the assumption that
investment needs are large in order to make provision for pro-
ductivity growth. Large investment needs are necessary to pro-
vide for employment, improve standards of living and to provide
the framework for economic developments. Some Americans see
this problem as one arising from inadequacies in the structure
and operations of the financial system.
The capital shortage problem is a shortfall of investment
relative to production requirements. In 1973 when the United
States experienced a sharp acceleration in prices the conse-
quence was severe capital constraints on the production of ma-
jor industrial materials. Industries like petroleum refining,
production of aluminum, steel, paper, and cement had operated
at their highest capacity levels since the second quarter of
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1951. In many of these industries there has been very little
productive capacity growth in recent years. Environmental regu-
lations have contributed to holdups in the construction of new
plants. These regulations have even led to the shutdown of some
existing plants, and have prevented the activation of some
standby capacities. Investment in new capital was discouraged
by the relatively low profits of United States domestic non-
financial corporations between 1966 and 1971.23 Productive ca-
pacity in the paper industry and also in petroleum refining
appeared to have grown less than two percent between 1969 and
1973. In the cement industry productive capacity showed little
or no growth and only one new petroleum refinery has been open-
ed since 1969.24
The lack of sufficient attention to investment incentives
in these industries and to the problems they face as a conse-
quence of environmental rgulations, has resulted to shortages
of many basic materials needed by other industries to expand
production. Because of these shortages business firms have been
unable to increase production rapidly enough to meet the de-
mands of their customers. There has also been tremendous in-
crease in the number of unfilled orders and delivery delays
have created price pressures, especially for shortage in the
supply of major materials.
In September 1974, the projections of capital needs and
savings potential of the United States economy was that busi-
23 The American Assembly, Columbia University. Capital For Productivity and Job
(N. J.; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977) pp. 2-3.
24 Ibid., p. 3
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ness investment and residential construction spending through
1985 would comprise a large share of G.N.P. than had been the
case during the period 1961 to 1973. Federal, State and local
governments would continuously have financing needs because of
capital shortage. For business and savings, there would be a
gap between projections of funds uses and savings during the
1974 - 1985 period. These projections implied that some sec-
tors, such as housing, small businesses, and even some large
businesses, would definitely be unable to achieve their prede-
termined levels of investment due to the difficulty of obtain-
ing finance. As such, productivity can be expected to decline
and the entire economy should anticipate severe financial dif-
ficulties.
The United States had the worst record of capital invest-
ment among the major industrialized nations during the 1960s.
Consequently, productivity growth during that period was among
the lowest of leading industrialized nations. Nations with high
productivity growth during that period were those that devoted
relatively more of their resources into capital investment. At
present the United States competitive position in world markets
is endangered by industrialized nations with good record of
capial investment. These nations have acquired more modern
plants and equipment, and have also replaced absolete ones.
Record on United States capital investments reflects the
heavy emphasis Americans are laying on personal consumption and
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government spending as opposed to savings and capital forma-
tion. Although the economy is sufficiently large and dynamic to
overcome this situation, future economic growth must be tied
much more directly to the adequacy of capital investments. It
is therefore necessary that United States government policies
become more supportive of capital investment and Americans need
to make a shift in their domestic policies away from continued
growth in personal consumption and government spending, toward
greater savings, capital formation, and investment. This is one
of the most important economic challenges of the decade ahead.
Concern about developments in United States financial mar-
kets first arose public interest during the years 1972 to 1974.
This came as a result of the enormous amount of external finan-
cing required by United States business firms. The increased
financing requirements and the continuous escalation of inte-
rest rates which took place during this period gave rise to
concerns about the ability of financial institutions and mar-
kets to supply sufficient funds to meet the investment needs of
business firms. A special concern was raised about the sources
of finance for smaller firms and firms with lower credit quali-
ty ratings.
As business financing almost completely fell off in 1975,
people began to replace these concerns with fear that the eco-
nomic explosion in the financing requirements of the United
States Treasury would "crowd-out" private borrowers. People
actually thought this crowding out in the financial markets
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would limit the ability of business investments and housing
expenditures so that the economy would get out of recession.
Over the longer run then, this would limit the capital forma-
tion that was necessary to assure the productivity growth and
employment which would support rising standards of living and
keep the United States economy competitive in world markets.
The situation however, turned out to be worse because of a
mismatch between the needs of investors and the preferences of
savers. There were instead excesses of financing in the early
1970's which left some financial institutions in positions that
made it difficult for them to play their necessary roles in
financing the legitimate needs of investment toward expanding
the entire economy.
The large volume of business financing that occurred be-
tween 1973 and 1974 was the result of several forces within the
economy. Business expenditures on fixed assets expressed as a
percent of G.N.P. remained at historically high levels through-
out this period. Industry investment in physical units also
remained at a relatively constant and moderate level during
this period. However, inflation which was especially pronounced
in industrial material prices, caused replacement cost of in-
ventories used in production and sales to substantially exceed
their original production cost. Therefore business firms found
themselves forced to finance extraordinary large increases in
the book value of their inventories. Consequently, the pre-de-
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termined objective to increase the rate of productivity growth
was unfilfilled.
The concern about the rate of United States productivity
growth is an important issue because productivity is the major
source of the economic growth that enables a nation to raise
living standards. This concern goes along with that about capi-
tal because there's no record or statistical evidence, of any
country that failed to show an upward trend in productivity and
capital per work simultaneously. This is by no means a coinci-
dence because increase in productivity and the income it brings
establish capital formation. And capital formation helps to
increase productivity. Therefore, capital is an essential ele-
ment of productivity growth in any nation.
The height of concern about United States productivity
growth was during the recession of 1973 - 1975, when the growth
rate of capital formation came to a complete halt. For the
first time in twenty-five years, productivity declined for as
many as six quarters, two in 1973 and the rest in 1974•25 The
National Commission on productivity in 1975, shows that the
rate of increase in output per man-hour did tend to decline
gradually during the post war period. The trend rate of in-
crease was about 3.6 percent per annum around 1947, 3 percent
around 1960, and by 1974 it was down to 2.4 percent.
There were also cyclical declines in the rate of produc-
tivity growth which similarly occurred in other industrialized
25Ibid., p. 37
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nations. However, their average rates of productivity growth
have generally been higher than that of the United States be-
cause of the tremendous increase in their rate of capital
growth. The relatively slow rate of productivity growth expe-
rienced by America in recent years is the result of the low
rate of capital information.
Industrial societies and business firms have to save some
of their output for reinvestment in the replacement, moderniza-
tion, and expansion of industrial machines. This, which is also
known as the "industrial seed corn", is exactly the process of
capital formation and nations that neglect it find themselves
susceptible to scarcity, inflation, unemployment, and declining
standards of living. In recent years, the United States has
been eating very deeply into its industrial seed corn.
In the century of industrialization that began immediately
after the Civil War, the United States had a social, political,
and economic climate that favored savings and investment in
every business sector. With abundance of natural resources and
growing population, the United States was far ahead of other
nations in the process of capital formation. The nation was
also relatively ahead in terms of productivity and national
wealth.
However, in recent years the United States seems to have
lost touch with its basic formula for national success. Several
factors have contributed to this lost of track. There has been
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an increasing emphasis on consumption, especially in the form
of government services. Along with this has been loss of incen-
tives for savings and investment. Consequently, productivity
advances are declining and the capacity to provide advances in
real income and jobs for a growing labor force is also going
low.
In the wake of this economic problem the United States is
not alone. One of the negative repercussions of economic growth
is that nations are tempted to live beyond their means. This is
done in industrialized democratic nations where governments
come into power simply by promising more than the opposition.
The process is universal and has been seen at work in the
United States.
What do I mean when I speak of nations been tempted to
live beyond their means? In democratic nations the expectations
of people increase as politicians increase their promises in
the struggle to gain politial sovereignty. These expectations
become demands and then later entitlements. Government there-
fore respond to these demands by legislating more generous ser-
vices and benefits, taking increasing amount of wealth out of
the economy by way of taxes. The major emphasis here is usually
on consumption rather than production, or redistribution of
wealth rather than its creation. Hence, governments grow at
faster rates then the tax base that supports them.
Capital formation, then, which is the life - giving pro-
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cess by which nations reinvest part of what they make in future
productive capacity, is absolutely forgotten in the rush to
provide continuous and comprehensive welfare programs. And when
a nation begins to eat its seed corn, to discourage savers and
investors, to continuously tax away private and corporate earn-
ings, the rate of productivity growth will continue to decline.
In the United States the productive sector has tremendous-
ly declined due to government social welfare programs. More
people are either on payrolls or have joined the chronically
unemployed. Demand has exceeded supply, and the resulting in-
flation has accentuated conflict in the struggle to keep ahead.
Labor demands are far in excess of increases in productivity,
and the government is continuously increasing its welfare pro-
grams in response to political pressures. High rates of infla-
tion and unemployment are expected to become even chronic in
years ahead. Federal, state, and local government expenditures
have relentlessly increased from one-tenth of G.N.P. in 1929 to
more than a third of G.N.P. in 1977, and will pass fifty per-
cent in 1990's if the present trends continue.26
The United States economy has drifted out of balance be-
cause the government sector is growing faster than the tax base
that supports it. The consumer sector has been damaged by in-
flation, and its confidence has become very sensitive to
changes in the price index. And the producer sector, which pro-
vides the jobs and income on which everything in the economy
26Charles D. Kuchner, Capital and Job Formation. (Illinois: Dow Jones - Irwin,
1978), p. 5
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rests, is even losing its importance because of the lack of
means and incentives for capital investment.
Unless the United States can change its economic programs
by redirecting more of its annual output into strengthening the
productive sector, the nation will continue to face increasing
frustration of its economic and social goals. Full employment,
rising income, stable prices, greater energy independence, and
a tax base for social services require capital formation.
Labor 
Decline in the rate of United States productivity growth
has captured a great deal of attention in recent years from
both academic and business communities. Productivity gains have
dropped nearly in half during the past decade, resulting to
both increase in the rate of inflation and a slower rate of
economic growth. This decline in productivity is not a short-
run problem and therefore cannot be overcome by short - run
solutions. Even increased inflation rate takes time to reach a
particular height and it must equally take time to decelerate.
Productivity plays a key role in that process.
The rate of growth of labor productivity is important in
the process of econimic growth. In the present age when all
sectors of society seem to feel that they are entitled to an
ever-increasing standard of living, it is growth in output per
man-hour of labor input that enables each worker to increase
his or her standard of living. Workers are certainly expected
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to demand and obtain increases in nominal wages and it is in-
creases in productivity that will enable those dollars wage
increases to be translated into real wage increases. Therefore
any decline in the rate of increase in labor productivity
should be considered seriously, since such decline entails a
reduction in the rate of sustainable increase in standards of
living that any society can support.
An examination of the annual rates of growth in United
States labor productivity for the past thirty years (1948 -
1977) reveals a pattern of rates that considerably varies from
year to year. Among the highest growth rates was 8 percent in
1950 and the lowest of 3.4 percent in 1974. Even yet one of the
lowest (1.7 percent) occurred in 1949 and the third highest
(4.5 percent) in 1976.
In order to make sense out of these findings, I will adapt
the most frequently used method by comparing the years before
the late 1960's with those since then. Such a comparison does
give a broad spectrum of the rates of productivity and it also
indicates a significant fall off. To take one frequently used
division, between 1948 and 1966 labor productivity in the
United States grew at an average annual rate of 3.36 percent in
the private domestic business sector, while between 1967 and
1977 the average annual rate of increase fell to only 1.78 per-
cent. 27 Certainly this indicates that some economic disorder
occurred during that period.
27Shlomo Maital and Noah M. Meltz, Lagging Productivity Growth-Causes and 
Remedies (Mass: 	 Ballinger Pub., Co., 1980), p. 111.
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A division into two groups with the dividing point set in
the late 1960's, however, gives the single greatest indication
of a serious economic problem. And by way of contrast, it is
interesting to consider the average annual rates of growth over
each of the most recent decades. Between 1951 and 1960, labor
productivity grew at an average annual rate of 2.73 percent;
while between 1961 and 1970, the average rate of growth in-
creased slightly to 2.95 percent. Since 1971 there has been a
lower rate of growth, averaging only 1.86 percent. This rate
is heavily influenced by one unusual year, 1974, when actual de-
crease in labor productivity of-3.4 occurred. There was also a
serious disruption in the economy during that year caused by
the Arab Oil embargo.
Besides, the rate of United States labor productivity
growth has been seriously hindered by the sexual composition of
the workforce. More women have been employed since the late
1960's and to some extent this has affected the quality of la-
bor productivity. This should not be interpreted to mean that
female workers are necessarily less productive than males, but'
women entering the labor force during the period under conside-
ration have worked for less time than the average males who
were already in the workforce. This, couple with the large num-
bers of teenagers who have entered the job market in recent
years, represent lower quality human capital.
Still, there are other factors that resulted in the de-
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crease in the average ability of physical capital to contribute
to the production of output around 1970. In 1970 two social
regulations were passed by Congress which had power to substan-
tially alter the type of capital spending that business esta-
blishments could undertake in the United States. The year 1970
represented the peak of the environmental movement in America.
During that year the adoption of the legislation that created
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as well as the Clean
Air Act Amendments, which set strict auto emission standards
and directed EPA to determine ambient air quality standards,
came into existence. In addition, Congress also passed the Oc-
cupational, Safety and Health Act, which gave all employers a
"general duty" to provide a place of employment "free from re-
cognized hazards" and to comply with the Acts standards of
safety and health.
Both of these regulations have the potential for limiting
the rate of growth of labor productivity. To the extent that
there is limited amount of savings available in the economy due
to the importance attached to consumption, more of this saving
has been required for capital expenditures mandated to clean up
the air and provide safer working conditions. Therefore less
capital has been available for investment that could increase
the physical output of each worker. I am not arguing that the
two acts are socially counterproductive. The society may have
received benefits from them, but when total output of labor
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productivity is considered, they became impediments to the rate
of growth.
The Occupation, Safety and Health Act has affected the
growth rate of labor productivity in a way other than changing
the type of capital investments made. Compliance with the pro-
vision of the act necessitated revisions in the structure of
work and place of work. This includes such things as adjust-
ments in the speed of assembly lines and addition of certain
safety procedures to production processes. Therefore adoption
and enforcement of the Act resulted to industries having the
same number of workers using the same capital stock and produc-
ing less physical output.
It is apparent that much of the slack in the rate of pro-
ductivity growth since the 1960's came as the result of society
choosing other goals to pursue. A substantial part of the price
of these goals is lower rates of productivity growth. If
America desires to clean up its air, protect its workers from
on-the-job hazards, and also allow previously unemployed
workers with low levels of job experience to enter the labor
force, the society will surely be worse off achieving these
goals at the cost of lower rates of productivity growth.
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CHAPTER III 
Comparative trends in productivity
United States and Japan 
Concern about the causes and implications of the decline
in American productivity, especially in the wake of the Vietnam
War and the oil price action of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), has become a major subject in
United States economic history. Is it therefore helpful to com-
pare the American record with that of another country for the
same period. For this purpose, I have chosen Japan because it
is an important trading partner and rival of the United States,
and a country whose productivity increase rates seem to have
remained positive despite the economic crises of the 1970s
There is a widespread believe however, that productivity
in the United States has increased relative to that in Japan
and this is very much interesting to most Americans. The argu-
ment largely depends on the definition people give to produc-
tivity. If productivity is used to mean the real gross output
or the gross value added without deductions for depreciation of
fixed capital per employee or per labor-hour, and if the dollar
is evaluated relative to the yen and vice versa only in terms
of a purchasing power index over gross domestic products (GDP),
then American productivity in the late 1970's remained well above the
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Japanese in most major industries of the two economies. Even at
that, American advantages have decreased tremendously in most
industries since 1970.
Controversy over declined United States productivity rela-
tive to Japan can be reduced, if not eliminated, by looking at
differences in growth rates of the two nations. In 1952 the
Japanese level of technology was merely one-fourth of the
United States level. During the period 1952 - 1959 this diffe-
rence was reduced from seventy-five percent to fifty-one per-
cent. Entering 1960 the level of Japanese technology advanced
sharply relative to that of the United States, reaching nearly
ninety percent by 1968. Between 1968 and 1973 the level of
Japanese technology actually overtook the United States level,
such that by 1974 the aggregate level of technology in Japan
stood ahead of that in the United States. 28
There was a dramatic reduction in the difference between
United States and Japan total output during the period 1960 -
1974. This was the result of substantial increase in Japan ca-
pital input relative to United States capital input and the
closing of the gap between the two nations technology. Japan
and United States labor input grew at almost identical rate,
but the average annual growth rate of capital in Japan was
nearly three times the United States rate. Japanese productivi-
ty during the period under consideration grew at the rate of
four times that in the United States on average. And although
28William J. Boumol and Kenneth Mclennan, Productive Growth and U.S.
Competitiveness (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), p. 74
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the gap between United States and Japanese technology has been
closed since 1973, there still remain a substantial gap between
the capital intensity of production of the two nations.
Let me take this time to draw your attention to some other
factors that have influenced the rate of productivity growth of
Japan and the United States, Demographically, Japan has not
experienced the recent American problem of adapting large num-
bers of semiliterate rural workers to industrial discipline and
other production routines. Even though it has its racial minor-
ities and prejudices like America, but the numbers involved are
much smaller than in the American case. Besides, Japan has not
copied the United States affirmative-action policy despite the
trade link that is existing between the two countries_.
The Japanese problem in labor demographies is an aging
workforce which includes male workers who live longer, female
workers who enter or reenter the workforce just after their
youngest children are in school, and the rise of the age at
which both young men and women leave school. Even though older
workers are reliable and disciplined, they certainly lack the
physical strength and flexibility that is required at most
times to learn new techniques. A typical older worker is of
course a permanent employee as compared with a younger worker.
His pay is relatively high, and his employer would definitely
like him to retire earlier in order to make way for better,
younger and cheaper workers. Early retirement in individual
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case can be induced by a variety of informal social pressures
within an organization. Japan is still making research on
methods for expanding and formalizing a procedure for selecting
the more productive older workers without necessarily antago-
nizing the less productive ones. On the other hand, however, a
typical older female worker is a labor force reentrant and she
may or may not be a permanent worker. Nevertheless, if she be-
comes proficient at some lower level skill and is not too in-
sistent about promotions, the possibility of let go or lay off
in difficult times in very narrow.
Younger Japanese industrial workers, both blue collar and
white collar, are predominantly high school graduates. Most of
them are from secondary schools which are superior to American
public high school. 29 Proposals have been made in Japan to
send the academically less talented students into pure techni-
cal or vocational institutions and this was reaction in the
direction of the nation's pre- 1941 educational system. These
proposals are generally opposed by parents and they really seem,
not to have received widespread support. Nevertheless, there
are considerable amount of technical and vocational schools but
prestigious employers hesitate to hire graduates of these
schools for their main-line jobs. And once employed, the male
worker in the "good" company is assured to be a permanent employee.
Therefore Japanese employers make larger investments in technical
and vocational training on the job for their employees than it is
29 Ibid., pp. 74 - 75
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in the United States.
The American job-hopping problem does not exist in Japan.
In the United States one can never expect good teamwork, group
loyalty, or even a common interest in raising firm productivity
because jobs are very unstable and employees minds are filled
with insecurity. At most times either almost half the workforce
in any particular company will quit or will be laid off by man-
agement within twelve months. Therefore neither workers nor
company has any interest in the economic success of the other.
Workers, including managers, are not willing at any rate to
sacrifice to help build the future prosperity of the company
they work for since they are aware that they certainly will not
be around to share in that prosperity. Conversely, the company
is also not willing to invest in the future success of any in-
dividual worker, because that person has the tendency of accep-
ting employment elsewhere when the investment that goes into
training him pays off, if it does at all. The result of this
situation in the United States is gross underinvestment made by
companies in creating on-the-job skills necessary for indus-
trial success. Even though blue-collar workers are traditional-
ly trained on the job, but with today's high turnover rates
firms are reluctant to invest in training their workforce since
there is very high probability that the workers will soon leave
for other jobs. For the individual firm it is cheaper to bid,
with higher wages, to get a skilled and qualified worker away
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from other firms, but obviously this does not work for the eco-
nomy as a whole. The result is a perpetual shortage of skilled
and qualified blue-collar workers whenever the economy remotely
begins to approach anything remotely resembling full employ-
ment.
Looking at the rate of capital per worker for the two
countries, the higher Japanese propensity to save and lower
propensity to invest in private residential housing enter the
scene. Japan has a very slow consumer credit development pro-
cess and some people have even been tempted to call it underde-
velopment. This has meant that, in the inflationary en-
vironment of the 1970's, Japan had an increased saving to make
large down payments, which is in contrast to the United States
pattern of buying to beat the next price rise at the expense of
saving and investment.
The Japanese are less boostful about their managerial suc-
cesses than were their American predecessors in the period im-
mediately following World War II. They consider American work-
ers as being overpaid and lazy, a disease that threatens United
States prosperity. The notions known as "miracle management"
and "Theory Z" are from Japan and it's their system of managing
people and organizations. They practice the system that states,
"do as we do, and as we will teach you to do". Japanese actual-
ly wonder if their management methods can either be fully un-
derstood or effectively applied by people that are unfamiliar
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with Japanese culture. "Japanese culture" in this particular
context does not mean mere flower arrangement of tea ceremony,
as some may call it; rather, it refers to the Japanese ethical
and religious background in Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shin-
toism, together with the "way of the merchant" to which these
philosophies give rise during the early years of the seven-
teenth century.
The characteristic features of the general Japanese model
of personnel management for high moral and high productivity
include the following seven items:
1. Lifetime employment, at least for male workers, until
retirement age is reached, with possible dissmissal
only for cause which is granted after a brief trial
period, usually three months. This protects workers
against layoffs in slack business periods. It also
protect those workers whose skills may become obsolete
due to technical innovations or improved methods of
job performance.
2. Japanese believe in seniority wage system, under which
a worker's wage is related more closely to his senior-
ity, family responsibilities, and prior educational
record than to his on-the-job performance.
3. Loyalty of employees to companies for providing train-
ing opportunities, good wages, and fringe benefits.
Employees are not expected to leave companies volun-
tarily except remarkable opportunites arise elsewhere.
In fact, it is an unethical behavior for employers to
induce workers to leave one firm for another.
4. Great care is adapted in the selection of permanent
employees. The age limit and flexibility required to
absorb frequent training are attributes in great de-
mand and these attributes are judged by educational
records. Educational records include levels of exami-
nations passed, quality of schools attended and Civil
Service examinations or company established equiva-
lents. Interviews are usually long and often even more
important because management wants to know exactly how
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well the candidate will get along with people and also
how well he will absorb the company's mind and spirit.
They try as much as possible to estimate the indivi-
dual's tolerance of inevitable intervals of dull or
repetitive work and slow promotion. Potential mili-
tants and troublemakers in workplace whose actions
are likely to disrupt production or smooth operations
are absolutely weeded out.
5. Subjection of employees to frequent training, rather
than letting them rest on honors of techniques already
mastered. This is the system of employee job rotation
either in one department or various departments of the
same company.
6. Foremanship and supervision are highly regarded along
with development of skills in Japanese companies. They
are purposely aimed at identifying better workers,
eliminating less impressive jobs, and reducing workers
alienation all along the line. The Japanese foreman or
supervisor is less likely than the American to be a
sadist of the army sergeant type and more likely to be
a friendly teacher or scoutmaster.
7. In recessions or depressions, dividends, executive
salaries, executive bonuses, and other executive immu-
nities are cut before employees' numbers or incomes
are reduced. Even social pressures for early retire-
ment are applied to office and executive employees be-
fore spreading to workers at the bottom of the organi-
zational chart; it is almost never applied to young
male workers. One Japanese informant calls this fea-
ture "genuine economics-textbook capitalism" because
owners and managers of business bear the initial risks
of loss. American capitalism is quite opposite to this
system because major risks usually fall on workers by
being laid off.
The American occupation, encountering the Japanese system
for the very first time between 1945 and 1950, regarded it with
aversion and hostility. In the immediate postwar depression,
America considered this management style to mean merely the
retention of unneeded workers, which would result to high costs
and low productivity. Occupation efforts to force the Japanese
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goverment, particularly the Japanese National Railways, to dis-
miss excess workers almost led to dissolution of the system.
However, the Korean War (1950 - 1953) brought about the permi-
nent existence of the system and today it has become a subject
of interest, admiration, and even worth imitating.
The feature most frequently imitated, though in complete
isolation from the rest of the pattern, is the Quality Control
Circle (QC). This system allows employees to have weekly meet-
ings so as to identify ways and means of effectively performing
their duties. Problems are identified, suggestions made, and
solutions formulated and adapted. The employees decide how to
increase the quality of products so that customer satisfaction
can be assured. Therefore quality assurance and customer need
satisfactory are joint responsibility of management and emplo-
yees of Japanese firms. The system incorporates the energy and
ingenuity of workers and management in problem, cost reduction
methods and other aspects of improving operations. It makes
employees to create special affection for their jobs because
of the great deal of control they have over how their jobs
should be performed. Therefore competition exist among Japanese
corporations as to who has the best record for productivity
and quality assurance. Communication between management and
employees is organic, ie., information goes from top to bottom
and vice versa.
Conversely, in the United States top business executives
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are the decision makers with the approval of board members. All
decisions come from the top with directives for executives
whether the objectives of those decisions are attainable or
not. Communication between management and employees is mecha-
nistic because information flows downward with little or no
feedback in return. Suggestions from employees about improving
production and operation methods are rarely adapted by manage-
ment. This negative attitude on management part concerning em-
ployee suggestions is one hindrance to productivity growth in
the United States. For instance, if management of a particular
company realizes that an assembly line is moving slow, they are
readily inclinded to getting engineers from outside who will
suggest and implement a speed rate without consulting employees
who are directly working on that assembly line. Therefore in-
stallation of the new speed rate results to lower output if the
workers are unable to cope with the rate of acceleration. Total
productivity declines and then management wonders what the pro-
blem could be. This was the exact cause of General Motors work-
ers strike in 1972. Most times management will diagnose the
wrong issue because of their inability or unwillingness to con-
sult the workers on the cause(s) of the problem and how best it
could be solved. Assembly line workers feel like slaves because
such systems treat them as machines. And on most assembly lines
there is nothing like go to the bathroom, blow your nose, or
make a mistake; there is even no room for breakdown of machine
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or man, the assembly line stops for no man and the pace is us-
ually brutal. No matter how hard employees work, it is just not
good enough for the supervisors. Their chief occupation is to
stroll about the floor and make remarks like "Hurry up Guys".
Workers only follow orders which is morally terrifying as well
as physically exhausting. The idea behind American assembly
lines is, take a finished product and break it down into the
smallest number of tasks needed to make it, and then have one
person do just one task. 30 It is then assumed that the most-ef-
ficient means of production will be achieved thereafter.
United States productivity deterioration has become a na-
tional and a contemporary issue. Economists, businessmen and
government officials have become concerned about this issue to
the extent they fear it will reduce economic growth and in-
crease both inflation and unemployment simultaneously.
According to figures released by the Labor Department pro-
ductivity rate in the first quarter of 1979 declined at an an-
nual rate of 4.5 percent. Historically, the rate of productivi-
ty in the United States has been increasing about three percent
a year. It is often thought of as efficiency and in its most
commonly watched form, it refers to how much an individual
worker is capable of producing in a given amount of time.
In 1978 productivity growth in the United States showed an
unbelievable slowdown from accustomed rates as reported by the
Council of Economic Advisers, which consequently accentuated
30
The Assembly Line_: _Still Dehumanizing, "The New York Times", January 22, 1984.
the inflationary pressures and fundamental concerns about un-
derlying trends. This downward trend in productivity growth
meant the nations' outlook for long-term real economic growth
31dropped to three percent from three-and-one-half percent.
An increase in productivity allows employees to increase
wages without increasing prices because each worker produces
more. Even though wage increases have occurred in the United
States over the years, but because of slower productivity
growth the wage increases have not completely been offset by
output increases. Therefore costs to businesses have increased,
which raised prices, leading to more inflation. Higher prices
cut consumer purchasing power, reduce economic growth and in-
crease unemployment. Therefore enhancement of economic growth
necessarily means increases in productivity growth rates.
The success of Japan is sometimes considered as a mystery
by America and other western nations. The Japanese economy con-
sists of two favored theories which are habitually invoked by
American protectionists. The first is that the disciplined
Japanese culture gives the economy inherent advantages in com-
peting with rivals. Secondly both business and government are
simultaneously engaged in large ventures to gain economic domi-
nance. Success of the economy is therefore not a mystery and it
could be replicated by other nations. Japanese competitors are
not products of the mysterious East, but rather they are econo-
mic organizations responding rationally to opportunities and
31
productivity Rate Causes Wora, "The New York Times", May 8, 1979.
problems.
32 
They believe that the name of the game is "winners'
competitive cycle, and the winners are those who have got a
cycle going for themselves by boosting their share of market
more and faster than their rivals could." To lose in this game
could mean corporate death and so Japanese are reckless play-
ers, borrowing heavily at times while prices are slashed and
then investment made in productive capacities and promotions.
Obviously profits will suffer in such cases but only temporari-
ly and when the desired market share has been obtained, the
economy quickly recoups losses incurred out of increased earn-
ings. And in order for Japan to maintain or even to improve its
market share, the economy is constantly reconstructed. As in-
dustries rise and fall, new ones spring up to replace them; and
with few exceptions verdicts of the marketplace are absolutely
decisive. Companies that are seen as impediments to economic
prosperity are cut off without any mercy. The industrial land-
scape is not cluttered with noncompetitive market situation
that is fostered by government subsidy. One of the government's
most valuable contributions to the economy, which is never men-
tioned by Americans, is that it runs an excellent educational
system. As one author flatly stated, "Japan's labor force is
quite simply the best educated in the world."
One fundamental difference between United States and Japa-
nese corporations is the status of shareholders. Japanese
shareholders expect regular dividends just as American share-
32 Japan's Business Jungle. "Fortune", February 3, 1986, p. 132.
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holders, but a small one, generally around two percent of the
share price. They are not primarily after quick payoffs or big
quarterly jumps in dividends, but a solid market position that
will be rewarding over the long run. Therefore once their mo-
dest demand in dividends is met, they play no further role in
the company. Managers are free to do whatever they consider
necessary to strengthen their company's competitive position
over the long run. They are absolutely free from pressure to
show steady increases in earnings per share as American Man-
agers.
The exertion of profit pressure on Japanese managers would
have restrained many of the companies in the periods when they
were sacrificing almost everything just to gain critical market
shares. In effect, I am implying here that American Managers
are not free enough to consider their basic corporate values in
the struggle to survive and prosper in the international mar-
kets.
There are few cross-cultural borrowing in Japan, but for
the most part Japanese have surprisingly remained unchanged.
One of the most important features of their native characteris-
tics is the willingness to achieve consensus by compromising.
They believe that an individual is an extension of his immedi-
ate family members, his company, his community and his nation
as a whole. Therefore everyone is bound together in pursuing
common goals and objectives. Japan strongly feel that it is a
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"family" because nearly everyone has at least some saying about
how to run the society. Despite the size of a group, ie., from
the smallest enterprise to the large multinational corporation,
nothing gets done without getting the consensus of everyone
involved. Though the process is tedious and time consuming, but
the end result is fruitful, especially if the objective is to
achieve some economic gains from which everyone receives bene-
fits.
A good example of Japanese group consensus is the quality
decision. Plant and factory workers are encouraged and expected
to make group decisions about product quality making quality
control their top priority. Once a decision has been reached on
how a product's quality can be improved and maintained, every-
one automatically gets instilled with the notion that each
group member is a quality control inspector. If they spot a
faulty item during the production process, they are encouraged
to shut down the entire assembly line to correct that fault.
In the United States the situation is quite different and
far from group consensus. Plant and factory employees are ra-
ther given production quotas to meet within certain time limit
and decision as to whether these quotas are attainable or not,
are made by top management without employee's participation.
Therefore, though management could be interested in both quan-
tity and quality output, but the employees' attention will fo-
cus on producing more to meet the target with little or no re-
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gards for quality.
The Japanese today look down on what they regard as the
poor quality of American products. One example of this is au-
thentic and is familiar to any Japanese car dealer who at-
tempts to see American built automobile in Japan. The cars must
be given an additional coat of paint before they can reach a
satisfactory stage of demanding Japanese. Quality is a priority
to the Japanese, and their domestic market is the principal
battleground for most of the companies. Therefore products
shipped to other countries have high quality and low price in
large part because they have already survived the domestic mar-
ket. Says one American economist living in Japan. "their idea
of competition is different from ours, yet they compete fur-
iously; it is all done within the context of being very
Japanese - orderly."
New Products enter the Japanese domestic market with high
promotion frequency. In the electronics industry alone there
are eight major and a number of minor semiconductor firms batt-
ling for a lead in the manufacture of microprocessor and the
computer on a chip. This technology was pioneered by American
firms in the late 1960s, but Japanese companies have already
captured thirty percent of the world market for computer memory
chips. The rush to use the chips has even driven the nation's
automakers into precipitous competition just to come up with
new applications.
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In 1980 when Toyota introduced the world's first chip-ope-
rated voice syntheizer to warn drivers of low fuel and fluid
levels in their cars, Nissan Motor hustled out its competitive
versions just within weeks. And although Japanese believe in
competition both at home and abroad, they are strongly held
together by the national spirits of compromise, cooperation,
and willingness to endure short-term setbacks for the long-term
good of the nation, company or family in general. When these
features are brought together into the modern factory, the re-
sult is smoothly functioning enterprise that produces quality
goods. There is an easy working relationship between management
and labor. In fact, Japan has fewer strikes and less labor un-
rest than any major industrial power.33 The workers trust their
bosses for making the right decisions because everyone believes
that both labor and management are working together for the
good of everybody.
The United States is as quality conscious as Japan, but
the question is how to motivate employees to perform their jobs
with excellence. In order to answer this question Americans are
now inviting Japanese executives to help manage their busi-
nesses. They have found out that Japanese managers are famous
for inspiring loyalty, long hours and high quality production
in their workers. Japanese concept of consensus is presently at
work in San Diego at a Sony Television Manufacturing plant,
where Japanese executives are helping to supervise American
33How Japan Does It, "Time", March 30, 1981, p. 58.
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workers.
To begin with, time clocks are absolutely banned from the
premises of the plant and managers and workers converse on a
first-name basis. The gap between managers and employees is
narrow to the extent they have lunch together in the company's
cafeteria. Employees are briefed once a month by top execu-
tives on the goals and objectives of the company including
sales and production targets. They are encouraged to forward
their complaints at all times without any hesitation. Four
times a year all employees, including top executives attend
company paid parties. Says Betty Price, 54, and an assembly
line person, "working for Sony is like working for your
family."
The expression made by this employee, which is the same as
dozens of other American Sony workers in San Diego, is an abso-
lute measure of success that has been achieved at the plant. In
1981 the plant projected a 700,000 turn out of color television
sets, which is one-third of Sony's total world production. More
significantly, company officials are now proudly saying that
the plant's productivity approaches that of its Japanese faci-
lities.
The firm endlessly strives to build strong ties with its
employees with the hope that they will show loyalty to the com-
pany in return. Promotions are made from within, most of the
supervisors are high school graduates who have gained supervi-
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gory positions because of their hard work and dedication to the
company. During the 1973 - 1975 recession, when television
sales dropped and production slowed drastically, no employee
was fired. 34 The workers were instead kept busy with plant
maintenance and other routine work. In fact, Sony has not laid
off any employee since the plant was opened in 1972. Most
American workers like the Japanese management style and some do
not find it that foreign at all. As remarked by an American
supervisor at the plant, "A long time ago Americans used to be
more people-oriented just the way the Japanese are. It just got
lost somewhere along the way." The experience Americans are
gaining from Sony in San Diego might show them how to regain
some of their skills at employee relations.
In the United States there are differences among labor
leaders, industry and government on how best to curtail infla-
tion. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that increased
productivity is one effective way to solve this problem, but
surprisingly enough the agreement stops right there. Consider-
ing increased productivity as a national goal is one thing and
implementation of the goal is entirely another. The discussion
of increased productivity is usually done under conducive atmo-
sphere, but the closer it gets to the workplace the greater the
resistance from workers. Social theorists believed that Ameri-
can workers could be more receptive to increased productivity
if their salary conditions were improved and job securi-
34Consensus in Dan Diego, "Time", March 30, 1981, p. 58.
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ty assured. Contradiction of this notion was seen by the
General Motors strikes in 1972.
The strike at Lordstown, Ohio, was first characterized as
a revolt of youth workers against the tyranny of the assembly
lines. But when a similar strike was staged at the Norwood
plant by older and experienced workers, the situation was then
characterized differently.
The problem was that both young and old General Motors
workers saw that management's method of raising productivity
was nothing but a speed-up, trying to operate the assembly
lines faster and with reduced crews. Therefore they resisted
management's plan as workers anywhere could have done. And if
highly paid employees with top job security antagonize plans to
increase productivity, those plans may well be considered as
illusions and any expectation that great majority of workers
will be receptive is just naive.
American workers are not receptive to productivity im-
provement because they just don't trust their bosses in making
the right kind of decisions. And for management, they com-
pletely ignore consulting employees on how best to enhance pro-
ductivity improvement. Therefore plans to increase United
States productivity are blue printed, but the implementation
phase is always difficult to achieve. Of course workers' oppo-
sition to increase productivity can be transformed into coope-
ration, but management should be willing to grant bonuses for
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greater output, as well as encourage employees' participation
in decision making.
General Motors and other American automakers have pleaded
for years for relief from the defeat they have taken from
Japan. While sales of American-made cars have been declining,
Japanese-made Datsuns, Toyotos, Mazdas, and Hondas have been
imported to the United States at the rate of some 6,000
vehicles a day. This import flood has given Japan twenty-three
percent of the entire United States auto market. In March of
1981, General Motors' Chairman, Roger Smith, was stuck by Japan
imports rate to the extent he urged a "short-term voluntary"
cutback in imports and warned that the alternative solution
would be a trade-war with Japan. The high rate of Japan imports
has even become a political issue with the Reagan Administra-
tion and the government of Prime Minister Suzuki working deter-
minedly to settle the most controversial trade issue the two
countries have faced since World War II.
The main problem here is the rapid deterioration of a ma-
jor American auto industry over the past few years. In 1980
Detroit's automakers lost more than $4 billion and prior to
that time, United States annual auto production slumped by
thirty percent. By 1981 almost 200,000 American autoworkers
were unemployed, and many of them had little hope of ever re-
turning to work in their industry. To these workers as well as
to most United States auto executives, the impediment to their
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success is Japanese imports. Since 1975, annual sales of
Japanese cars in the United States have jumped from 800,000 to
1.9 million. 35
The trade issue between Japan and the United States has
taken on such importance because of the auto industry's key
role in the economy. At least one out of every five American
workers is employed either directly or indirectly in making,
servicing or selling cars. In addition to this, industries like
steel, glass and rubber are heavily dependent upon automobile
sales in order to keep their plants operating. Notwithstanding,
the suggestion made by some American automakers to restrict
Japanese imports so that their products can sell doesn't seem
to be receiving popular support. If trade restriction are
levied against Japan, the American consumers will be penalized
because then United States automakers will raise prices without
fear of being undercut by competition from Japan. Such protec-
tion in the United States could also have serious consequences
for the nation's foreign and defense policy. Therefore the best
and ultimate solution is for the United States automakers to
build products that are better and cheaper than anything Japan
has to offer.
Besides improving on quality in the United States, govern-
ment and business will have to get together, cooperate, and
provide some direction for industrial growth. One of the most
important factors responsible for the success of Japan is that
35
How Japan Does It, "Time", March 30, 1981, p. 54.
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both government and business work in harmony for the economic
and social advancement of the country. Japanese businessmen do
not have to bear heavy burdens of government regulations that
American industrialists do. For example, Japanese auto com-
panies get together with government officials and they agree on
a common design for antipollution equipment. Similarly, govern-
ment and business work out mutually acceptable agreements for
solving health and environmental related problems. Today,
Japanese carmakers are at least two years ahead of the United
States in emission control technology.
The situation in the United States is quite contrary to
that of Japan and it seem as if government and business have an
adversarial relationship. Most government activities that are
related to business actually don't tell the businessmen how to
succeed but instead they emphasize on what not to do. The gov-
ernment doesn't seem to feel obligated in any way to help in-
dustry grow so that American citizens can improve their living
standards. Even the auto emissions regulation is such that each
auto company work independently to develop its own system.
There is no formal organization coordinating government and
business. Efforts to improve productivity growth are applied in
opposite directions resulting to a productivity dilemma. There
is a need for consensus between government officials and busi-
nessmen in order to overcome obstacles surrounding the downward
trends in United States productivity growth.
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Japan shows that a large and complex society can function
smoothly in a disorderly world environment if people are will-
ing to make some compromises in order to achieve larger objec-
tives. Government and businesses in Japan therefore look five,
ten or even twenty years ahead and try as much as possible to
build an economic prosperity that promises to last. Executives
are constantly doing their utmost to provide employees and
their families with a stable life and hope for the future. Such
condition hardly exist in any sector of the United States
economy. Everyone is out there fighting for his own economic
gain even if it is attainable at the expense of others. Though
America is reach with natural resources, but because common
consensus is almost never obtained in efforts to achieve
national objectives, the nation is finding it very difficult to
overcome its economic problems. The Japanese way of managing
affairs is in many respects, tied to the unique outgrowth of
the country's historical experience, but certain of its lessons
are applicable to industrial economies everywhere, particular
in the United States.
America in any case, needs to realize that teamwork, de-
spite the nature of its organization, is the prerequisite for a
prosperous society. Like in Japan, the economic success of the
nation is not the concern of the business sector alone, but
rather the government, citizens and businessmen. In fact, the
deposits of Japanese citizens is a major source of capital that
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is keeping the plants modernized and productive. It is the sav-
ings of all kinds government, corporate and personal that has
enabled Japan to get to the top and continue to stay there. For
instance, during 1980, Japanese workers saved an estimated
twenty percent of their individual and family incomes, more
than three times as much as the American.36 The high propensity
of citizens savings has given the country more momentum to
advance its economic growth.
36How Japan Does It, P. 57.
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CHAPTER IV
Other Major Influences on Productivity
Management-Labor Relations 
Productivity should be looked at from many perspectives
and there is a need in the United States to explore the rela-
tionship between management and employees. The greatest single
impediment to productivity improvement in America is the adver-
sary relationship between labor and management. Management and
workers have completely different goals, aspirations and needs
because both groups are not motivated in the same direction.
Productivity improvements often require capital formation
needed to build new plants, modernize old ones and eliminate
obsolete ones. Labor-saving technology may also be necessary
which includes work-rule changes. Unfortunately, however, most
American workers are absolutely against productivity improve-
ments because they are likely to be penalized by layoffs and
fewer work hours.
The greatest single reason for workers' opposition to pro-
ductivity improvements in the United States is job insecurity.
When management discovers and adapts productivity improvement
techniques which at times entail automation, employees are im-
mediately laid off without being retrained or compensated for
the cost of finding new jobs. Employees are treated by manage-
ment with no compassion which results to strained relationship.
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They receive no financial gains, nor are they persuaded that
reduced costs will benefit them. But they readily see that
management benefits from every productivity improvement. Ob-
viously the answer to United States productivity problem will
not be found in chaos.
American executives are very much hesitant, if they are
willing at all, to share the benefits of increased productivity
with employees. These executives believe that management is
solely responsibile for productivity improvements and therefore
gains should not be shared. They hold to the notion that em-
ployee incentives will deteriorate over certain time period and
get out of control. Some of these executives actually don't
know how to share gains because the process seems too compli-
cated to them. They end up doing nothing which accentuates the
already existing adversary relationship.
Strikes, lawsuits, grievances, injunctions and restrictive
work rules are counterproductive. 37 Precious time and energy
that could be devoted to making meaningful decisions is always
diverted into needless game playing between management and
workers, where most times everyone ultimately loses. most mana-
gers appear to have accepted the inevitability of adversary
relations with their employees and have developed ways of ope-
rating successful under such conditions. These managers have
decided that reduced costs and increased productivity come from
management's efforts, improved technology and by using of more
37Michael Le Boeuf, The Productivity Challenge (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1982)
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effective and faster machines. They more likely seem to comple-
tely disregard worker cooperation and so they cannot see any
sense to sharing productivity gains. As such productivity im-
provement programs only stress productivity without workers
support. There are no incentives for the workers and so they
are just not enthusiastic about their jobs in any way. Workers
do not identify themselves with the companies they work for
because they are convinced that such gestures will do no good
for them in any case.
Productivity improvement programs require share responsi-
bility between management and workers. "Share Economy," as
Martin Weitzman calls it, is important for economic growth es-
pecially for the United States where productivity is contin-
uously declining. It is a brilliant idea for the 1980's, but
its true success will depend on how to address the problems of
the 1990's.
By the 1990's if industrial nations, including the United
States don't encounter some catastrophe, the real effect of
computers on the way wealth is created will be seen. By then
there may well be few people working in factories and offices
to share corporate responsibility.
Today in manufacturing there are handful of engineers who
design the components and assemblies for cars, washing machines
and other consumer products. These engineering designs are cen-
tral to computer data base which automatically support all
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facets of production.
If this trend of technological advancement continues, by
the 1990's there no longer will be need for draftmen to draw
blueprints for any manufacturing purpose. Engineers will create
computer programs to drive machine tools; process planners will
develop a sequence of manufacturing steps needed to make a giv-
en part; schedulers expedite the flow of work through plants;
clerks handle inventory records, machinists load work pieces,
change tools and fixtures for machines and other production
equipment; while assemblers put parts together into products
for shipment. Even jobs for welders, painters and many others
will no longer exist.
Traditionally these are human tasks that will then be per-
formed by programmable machines under the control of computers
with software programs to plan and track factory operations.
This view of manufacturing is obviously not a fantasy because
it is far closer to implementation than some people may know.
The computers, controls, and material- handling equipment for
computer-integrated factories do exist at present. Lots of
software also exist and much more is in development.
Being aware of the negative effects these technologial
advancements will have on job situations, American workers are
bitterly against automation. They consider the success of these
programs an impediment to their economic well being because the
accumulated benefits will be enjoyed by management without re-
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gards for their participation. The United States economic pro-
blems of today, 1990,s and after will have to concentrate on
ways to distribute economic gains between management and emplo-
yees.
Inflation is almost chronic in the United States because
increases in compensation per man-hour exceed the rise in out-
put per man-hour. Certainly if employees are demanding more
from management than they can offer, the gap thus created be-
tween revenue and expenses must be filled by price increases.
Worker wage demands in the United States is almost never
in conformity with output because no industry operates in a
vacuum. Whatever is done for one group, however logical or ne-
cessary it might seem, is likely to affect the demands from
other groups as well. Therefore the tendency is that wage rates
in all areas of the economy move together which makes wage bar-
gaining based on productivity of any one group or industry very
dangerous. This wage demand system has completely displaced the
logic that workers in an industry should be rewarded for in-
creases in output because they are somehow responsible for
those increases. Labor leaders are most concerned with seeking
the largest possible wage increases and fringe benefits for
their members without any regards for the long-run impact of
their agreements on corporate earnings and how this may even
impinge on capital formation.
The United States organized labor system is very different
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from labor systems in other industrialized and third-world na-
tions, which is also contributing to the slow rate of produc-
tivity growth. Every classified group of employees in United
States business establishments has its own labor organization
independent of any other within the same company. Each group or
unit negotiates with management separately and strike time va-
ries depending on management's response to workers' demands, As
the result business executives spend more time bargaining with
labor leaders when in fact they should be making plans toward
economic improvement. Strikes are usually followed by momentary
standstill in operations and the system seems more or less per-
petual because each group keeps surveillance on the activities
of the others. Sometimes negotiation ends into a deadlock and
then both management and workers end up achieving nothing at
last.
Conversely, in other nations each company has one recog-
nized labor organization despite the number of employees or
size of the company. Therefore management negotiates with one
set of labor representatives, and whatever is achieved during
such negotiations is applicable to every worker indiscriminate-
ly. Hence, sufficient time is spent on long-term planning ra-
ther than spending countless time bargaining with several units
of workers. Most nations experience fewer employee unrest than
the United States, where more time is spent around bargain
tables 38
38How Japan Does It, p. 54.
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American managers are always preoccupied with making the
most of today's decisions and assuming that tomorrow will take
care of itself. Unfortunately when tomorrow has arrived they
lately realize that it isn't taking care of itself in any con-
ceviable way. The net result is that opportunites are missed,
and then managers spend much of their time busily conferring
with each other and wondering why they have worked so much but
practically little or nothing has been accomplished.
The adversary relationship between management and workers
is even causing management more losses than mere time consump-
tion. Legal costs have become substantial portions of com-
panies' financial outlays and increasing share of management is
made up of lawyers rather than engineers. This stems from mana-
gement involvement in business related legal activities and the
undermining of market forces that are inevitable results of
protectionism.
American workers are no longer willing to offer loyalty
and dedication to companies. They have reduced their efforts
and everyone seems to be working just enough to keep his job.
Even though companies are yawning for employee commitment to
work situations, it appears unattainable under the existing
relationship. Employees are fully conversant of the fact that
management will abandon them whenever there is a downward trend
in business activities. Even if cost-saving techniques are dis-
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covered by workers they are never brought to the attention of
management because that would leave the workers with no jobs.
Workers in the United States could be excellent and nearly or
possibly more productive as their colleagues in Japan, but they
are not encouraged to offer their best.
Managerial Philosophy
There are three basic sources of productivity in every
economic setting. First is labor, which is the mental and phy-
sical efforts of workers; second is management, the activities
of planning, coordinating, motivating, and controlling; and
third is technology, the combination of machines transferring
energy into useful work. Historically the greatest improvements
in the productive powers of workers came about through the di-
vision of labor. Today the organization of workers is the first
and most important managerial contribution to productivity.39
It is comforting to assume, as some Americans do, that the
trend of increasing productivity in the United States after the
Industrial Revolution is still in progress. People often say
that machines will increasingly replace the labor of men and
women, with the benefits geared toward raising the American
standard of living. Certainly if the economic pattern the
United States established during the Industrial Revolution were
to continue up to the present time, progress by now would have
ultimately overcome poverty.
The constantly rising productivity trend during and after
39
James O'Toole, Makin9 America Work-Productivity and Responsibility (New York:
Continuum, 1981), p. 1.
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the Industrial Revolution leveled at some point and then began
to fall. It was thought to be just a temporary setback, but the
growth rate seems to be continuously declining year after year.
There are many reasons for this downward trend in United States
productivity, some of which I have already explained in pre-
vious chapters. Nevertheless, I also strongly believe that the
nation's economic woe is rooted in the managerial philosophies.
In most organizations in the United States managers stub-
bornly retain certain product mix, technology and work process-
es that were appropriate in the 1950's but have now become ob-
solete. Therefore an attempt to increase foreign competition is
almost never fruitful and the productivity of labor declines.
The workers in effect suffer the cost of mismanagement by been
laid off.
Sometimes productivity may be accelerating in one of many
branches of a particular company and the unusual record of per-
formance in that branch may have been achieved through
"self-management", ie, giving workers more autonomy. But manag-
ers in central headquarters may decide the branch has been ope-
rating outside of company's staffing norms and therefore intro-
duce several layers of managers. 40 Consequently productivity
in that branch drops to the company's average because there are
too many people giving too many orders.
Most managers have the assumption that workers are lazy
and irresponsible and therefore they must always be told what
40Ibid, p. 4.
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to do. Unfortunately this does not hold for every worker
because there are some workers who are ambitious and dedicated.
Managers however, are unable to make use of the talents of the
good workers because of the assumption they hold. Employees
have become accustomed to awaiting orders before performing
their duties even if they are aware of what should be done in
any case. As the result workers who are interested in the
intrinsic rewards of their jobs find it very difficult to
achieve those rewards. They become frustrated and this results
to high employee turnover. Managers fail to realize that
workers are not all alike; they have different needs,
interests, and motivations, and these characteristics
constantly change over the career of each worker. 41
Workers and union officials in the United States are fre-
quently skeptical of emphasis on increased productivity. They
fear that to increase productivity will mean that some workers
will lose their jobs and American executives agree with a majo-
rity of union members that productivity gains benefit companies
at the expense of companies employees. 42 In effect business
executives are not convinced that increased productivity can
help organizations, employees and it is a vital necessity in
the fight to control inflation and meet foreign competition.
United States executives are too worried about making
short-term profits for their companies and this zeal has caus-
ed them to have little concern about their workers. This is the
41Ibid, p. 5.
42Robert A. Sutermeister People and Productivity, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976),
p. 76.
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result of pressure they receive from shareholders to show
constant increases in dividends at the end of every quarter.
Those managers who will fail to achieve this objective by
showing losses may soon fine themselves looking for new jobs. 43
Therefore most of the managers of United States businesses
don't work with the assumption that either they or their
workers will spend an entire career with any one company.
Hence, turnover is high and there is less incentive for
managers to invest in the long-range development of people.
United States companies failure to consider the long-range
potential of workers is just a fragment of the problem.
Long-range investments such as buying new plants and equipment
or funding research and development are crucial and have been
neglected because managers are under immense pressure to make
today's profit picture look as bright as possible. Investing in
the future, decisions to innovate and update are all postponed
in the name of squeezing the last drop of profit out of today's
income statement. 44
The American automobile industry is an example of manage-
ment interest in short-term results at the expense of
long-range prosperity. After the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, it be-
came obvious that skyrocketing energy costs were definitely
going to make highly gas consumption autos no longer practical
for the vast majority of Americans. Instead of committing re-
sources to a long-range policy of developing high-quality,




fuel-efficient cars, the auto industry scaled down existing
models and hoped for the best in the future. Consequently in
1980, fuel-efficient foreign cars accounted for nearly 30 per-
cent of the United States auto market. Opting for short-term
profits in 1973 put Chrysler on the endangered species list and
posted record losses for Ford and General Motors in the eigh-
ties. 45 Yet, short-term thinking is more the will than the
exception in the corporate offices of America today.
One of the biggest pressures on American executives comes
from Wall Street, where the dominant idea is to make today's
financial statement attractive and increase the value of com-
pany stock. As remarked by Andrew Fuller of Microdata Corpora-
tion, "When you are down, you can't see future performance
worth a damn on Wall Street". And the main reason managers opt
for short-term results is that shareholders and board of direc-
tors evaluate the financial and career incentives of managers
using short-run performance as the basic criterion.46 Promo-
tions, bonuses, stock options and other management decisions
are all based on today's profits. Economic incentives that
should be tied to long-range company growth are rare or probab-
ly nonexistent. And managers, as anyone else, behave in their
own interest or at least to the point they know they have a
job.
Most corporations in the United States are bureaucratical-
ly structured such that nothing goes on without passing through
45 Ibid, pp. 75 - 76.
46 Ibid, p. 76.
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established channels. Layers of middle management are constant-
ly added to organization structures which in effect widens the
communication gap between people at the top and those at the
bottom. As information is sent from the top to the bottom each
manager reveals those information he feels should be dissemi-
nated and reserve part as means of gaining more power.47 The
result of this is that top management is frequently divorced
from reality and is unaware of what goes on at lower levels.
When it comes to realize that communication has been distorted,
it is then too expensive to correct the situation; hence objec-
tives and goals are unfulfilled.
The Energy Crisis 
The crisis in the world's oil market began in October,
1973 and it has been general agreed that the problem was a
sympton of something more profound. If the problem had simply
been that of the oil trade, it would have probably been impor-
tant enough to command world attention. But unfortunately the
meaning of the crisis seems to have been bigger than oil, maybe
even bigger than the Middle East War that triggered it.
During the fifteen months of the crisis, a series of tran-
sformations occurred regarding how the crisis was perceived. At
first, in the first few months after October, 1973, the crisis
was generally seen as a threat to the security of the oil im-
porters' supplies. Then around the beginning of 1974, immedi-
ately after crude oil price had violently moved upward, the
47Ibid, p. 81
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focus of concern in most countries shifted to the question of
price. By mid year of 1974, however, the concern over price was
converted into a concern over the international monetary mecha-
nisms as a whole; with considerable doubts as to whether insti-
tutions existed or could be created that would be capable of
handling the massive shifts in financial resources that were
developing.
Though perceptions of the nature of the crisis went
through several changes, but for the United States it presented
some extraordinary difficult political and economic probelms.
It struck two blows simultaneously, with the ultimate conse-
quences coming gradually to light during 1974 or since the end
of the winter crisis. The first was a political blow, which
made the American public to become aware for the first time
that the United States was vulnerable in vital matters such as
its energy supply. The second was economic in nature, which was
the very large increases in the price of oil that came on top
of some considerable increases in prices generally between 1971
and 1973, confronting the oil-importing countries with an es-
sential new situation. In the United States the higher prices
of imported and domestic petroleum maneuvered their way through
the chain of economic interdependencies until they appeared in
the form of increased prices for other kinds of energy and for
energy-intensive goods and services. 48 They substantially rais-
ed the cost of living, particularly in their massive impact on
48Raymond Vernon, The Oil Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1976), p. 73.
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the heating and cooling bills of householders. Possibly too,
they may have contributed to the start of the recession and
unemployment of 1974.
The United States became a net importer of petroleum pro-
ducts in 1947. Thereafter total consumption rose from approxi-
mately 6 million barrels per day in 1948 to a volume slightly
under 17 million prior to the embargo in 1973. Production of
domestic crude oil and other liquids rose from 5.9 million bar-
rels per day in 1948 to 10.8 million in 1973. Imports repre-
sented over 30 percent of consumption by 1973; by midway in
that year, direct imports of Arab oil into the United States
were running over one million barrels per day, up from less
than half that amount a year and a half earlier.49
Several factors contributed to the rapid growth in the
demand for oil in the United States through the 1960s, The most
important factor was probably the fall in domestic real prices
for oil. In 1969 the price of oil, as compared with the prices
of other products at wholesale, was 10 percent lower than it
had been eleven years earlier. Similar drops occurred in the
real prices of gasoline and fuel oil. Energy was actually be-
coming cheaper relative to almost everything else, and demand
both in the United States and in the world responded according-
ly.
There was also a rapid increase in America imports during




natural-gas supplies under regulation, the disappointingly low
rate of growth in nuclear power, the environmental restrictions
on strip mining and on the burning of coal, on the development
of domestic oil supplies, and on motor vehicle emissions, and
conflicting government policies.50
In America consumption of oil and its products grew at an
annual rate of over 4 percent during the 1960s, reaching to 5.4
percent annual growth rate during the period 1967-72. Domestic
sources failed to keep pace with these increases in demand. One
factor that depressed the long-term development of domestic
crude-oil reserves was the severe restriction on output that
was imposed during the 50s and early 60s by state prorationing
controls. For instance, in 1963, the large, efficient, and
low-cost oil fields in Texas cut back production to under 30
percent of maximum efficient rate, while the high-cost stripper
wells were permittd to produce without restriction. This re-
sulted to a depression of profit incentives for further explo-
ration and development.
It is expected that when demand presses upon capacity, as
it did upon domestic capacity after 1970, price will rise and
the market will search for cheaper alternatives. For the United
States in the early 1970s, the cheaper alternative was imported
oil. Until 1973, quantitative restrictions on imports prevented
the wholesale substitution of foreign for domestic production.
However, when increasing for lagging domestic supply began to
50 Ibid., p. 74.
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push prices up, import restrictions immediately gave way. In
the meantime, instead of the alternative domestic energy sourc-
es absorbing part of the incremental demand as oil prices rose,
they contribute elements of their own to the growing shortage.
The prices of oil and every other fuel were escalating
during the early 1970's both on domestic and international oil
markets. However in August, 1971, domestic prices suddenly en-
countered the barrier of price controls. Domestics prices were
therefore held down until early 1973. During the first few
months of that year, the American price index for refined pe-
troleum products rose by over 30 percent. Domestic crude prices
also climbed by more than 50 cents per barrel. Meanwhile, in
April, 1973, import controls were suspended, and the rapid ris-
ing import prices of crude oil and petroleum products had an
increasingly strong effect on domestic consumer goods. Cost of
living was high to the extent the Cost of Living Council in
August, 1973, imposed a two-tie price ceiling. "Old" oil was to
be sold at prevailing prices plus 35 cents per barrel, while
oil produced in excess of 1972 levels and imports were free to
sell at uncontrolled market prices. The purpose of this measure
was to prevent windfall gains by producers on already developed
oil, while at the same time encouraging the production of more
new oil.
I am not certain whether price controls had any substan-
tial negative effect on domestic production and capacity prior
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to the embargo in 1973. Actually the period of rigorous con-
trols was short, and prices did not move ahead explosively as
soon as the controls were relaxed. What the price controls did
not do was to discourage and restrict demand, which would be
the effect in the early 1970s of substantial price increases.
By the fall of 1973, the United States energy economy had
become heavily dependent upon imported oil supplies. The domes-
tic petroleum prices were already increasingly influenced by
the rising world price. And for several years the domestic
energy economy had increasingly fallen short of meeting the
demands upon them because of imperative of regulation, poli-
tics, environmental protection and technological obstacles. 51
Therefore the United States was forced to turn to imports in
ever larger amounts. That of course was not the result of a
conscious policy decision taken with the need of energy securi-
ty in mind. As it was then, prices of oil and other petroleum
products were rising fast enough in 1972 and 1973 to alarm
those governmental offices responsible for price stablization.
The United States government decided to abolish limits on oil
and product imports in April, 1973, and replaced them with
small tariffs.
One factor that affected both governmental policy and pu-
blic opinion was the simple inability to believe that the
United States was unable to independently survive during the
1973 oil crisis. Even though adequate survey of public atti-
51Ibid., p. 77.
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tudes on the embargo was not on hand, but considering the long
American experience of economic power, its general feeling of
invulnerability to economic pressure that has been manifest
since World War II up to the early 1960s, the American public
and most policy makers in government obviously did not take
foreign threats of economic retaliation very seriously. The
image they had of the United States economy was that of a might
structure for national production, the most efficient in the
world, supported by the best science and technology, the most
skilled work force, and the most imaginative and resourceful
management, which is solidly based on an abundance of natural
resources 52
The United States dependence on crude oil and other petro-
leum products supplies from outside during the 1973 embargo,
which was an economic weapon maneuvered by a group of small
third-world countries, was inconceivable. The Arabs particular-
ly directed their embargo against the United States because
they strongly believed that Israel was created by the United
States and that its policies and actions, specifically the 1967
war and its refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories,
were all supported by America.
During the crisis principal industrial and commercial
users of crude oil and other petroleum products were greatly
affected. Automobile industry, trucking industry, airlines,
railroads and farmers were all never assured of adequate sup-
52 Ibid., pp. 77 - 78.
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plies and stable prices. Production slow down in these indus-
tries and there were neither investment incentives to boost
economic growth. Cost of production became extremely high to
the point some producers of goods and services cut back on job
offer which ultimately increased the unemployment rate. There
were conflicting aims and demands of economically significant
groups and the energy policy in the United States during the
crisis was confused and somehow ineffective.
In December, 1973, the Energy Administration Committee
took away 1.5 million barrels of jet fuel from the military and
allocated them to civilian airline companies which were faced
with severe shortage that threatened a curtailment of services.
Intercity truck operators demanded preferential allocations,
higher speed limits, and a price rollback on diesel fuel. Con-
ditions did not readily improve and so these operators rein-
forced their demands by blockading and disrupting highway traf-
fic.
The Environmental Protection Agency suffered some reverses
in standards as the shortage became severe. The Clean Air Act
and automobile emissions standards also came under heavy attack
by industry lobbies. In fact, the automobile industry
petitioned for postponement of the deadline for E.P.A. standard
under the act. The entire economy was in chaos and situations
were very much unstable because the crisis affected every
industry, either directly or indirectly. The consequences of
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the crisis were apparent because of the close relationship that




Present Productivity and Future Trends 
The United States has been in the productivity dullness
for several years, and there is a growing concern about the
causes of and the solutions to this perplexing problem. It ap-
pears that no other single issue is of greater common interest
to government, business, and labor than the issue of produc-
tivity. It is probably in this particular area that leaders
from all groups alike recognize economic improvement as the key
to meeting their common needs and expectations. Government
leaders view improved productivity as critical to balancing
fiscal budgets, eliminating trade deficits, conserving scarce
resources, and improving services provided to citizens. Busi-
ness leaders see it as the means to reduce costs, improvement
profit margins, and increase market share. Labor leaders assu-
mingly look at it as the means to control the growth of job-
eliminating imports and to improve worker compensation. Hence,
every group in the United States sees productivity improvement
as the means of achieving some economic gain, whether the va-
rious expectations are congruent or not, is completely another
issue.
Productivity growth is important in achieving national,
business and personal goals. The primary benefits of greater
productivity growth is that more can be produced in the future,
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using the same or fewer resources, and then standard of living
can be raised. The future economic pie of a nation, therefore,
can be made bigger by improving productivity, thereby supposed-
ly allowing a bigger slice of that pie for each person. Con-
stantly expanding the future economic pie can help to avoid
clashes between contending groups fighting for smaller pieces
of an insufficient pie.
From a national perspective, productivity improving is the
only source of increased real national wealth of any nation.
The more productive use of resources reduces waste and con-
serves scarce or expensive resources. Increases in wages,
prices, and other living costs contribute to inflation if there
is no productivity improvement to equally match them. 53 Pres-
sing problems such as inflation, unemployment, increasing trade
deficit, and unstable currency can be solved by achieving
steady growth in productivity.
From a personal perspective, productivity growth is the
major determinant of increasing the real standard of living and
the best utilization of available resources to improve the qua-
lity of life.
For the business community, productivity improvement can
lead to more responsive customer service, increased cash flow,
improved return on assets, and greater profits. More profits
create investment capital for the expansion of already existing
capacities and provide new job opportunities. When productivity
53David Bain, The Productivity Prescription (New York: McGraw-Hill Book C
1982), P. 4.
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growth is steady within a company, that company's competitive
position in its product market, both domestic and foreign is
always likely to be solid.
Profit margin in business can be improved either by in-
creasing sales or by reducing costs or by a combination of
both. Usually most management of business focus their attention
on increasing sales with lesser emphasis on controlling, if not
reducing, costs. This attitude could lead to conditions that
may bring about expanding markets and steadily increasing
sales, provided there are no offsetting increases in variable
costs. In some businesses, particularly those that are capital
or equipment intensive and in which the fixed element of cost
is higher, such method is more profitable because per unit pro-
fit will actually increase with high volume of sales despite
significant increases in variable cost per unit.
United States business executives like people in general,
seem to have the tendency of migrating toward the comfortable.
Instead of confronting the issue of controlling costs, it is
generally more comfortable to ride the wave of increasing de-
mand.54 Hence, increasing productivity, ie., the reduction of
unit costs while at least maintaining or preferably increasing
volume of outputs, has generally not been given proper em-
phasis.
The history of productivity in the United States over the
past few years does not make for pleasant reading at times.
5 4Ibid., P. 5-
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After World War II United States labor productivity grew by
more than 3 percent per year. In the mid-1960s, productivity
started to decline and the record for the 1970s shows a further
erosion of the productivity growth rate. Productivity gains
from 1973 to 1977 averaged only 1 percent, while between 1977
and 1978 growth rate fell to less than 1/2 of 1 percent.55
In 1979, the productivity growth rate for business fell to
a minus quantity and continued to decline for six consecutive
quarters. In recent times there has been some intermittent,
norminal and quarterly increases, but there continues to be
little, if any, growth in United States productivity.56 For
every practical purpose, United States productivity has shown
no substantial growth since 1977 and some of that erosion can
be blamed on the ups and downs of the business cycle. Generally
when an economy heads into recession, productivity growth will
begin to decline. During such times, total output is usually
reduced more sharply than employment. Productivity growth also
declines during recessions due to loss of economies of scale as
capacity utilization drops. The 1974 - 1975 recession in the
United States was especially sharp and it accounts for some of
the loss in productivity.
Productivity has fallen and costs have steadily risen over
the years. While output has been declining, compensation for
that output has continuously been increasing. Wage increases,
salary adjustments, cost-of-living increases, and benefit-pack-
55 Ibid., pp. 5 - 6
56Ibid., p. 6
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age improvements have all taken place in the United States over
the past few years, but because there has been no corresponding
increases in productivity, businesses made up the difference by
raising prices. It hurts every individual in the United States
because costs are rising faster than productivity and prices
are increased to compensate for the difference, which is affec-
ting the consumers. These price increases are also affecting
the cost-of-living escalators built into many labor contract in
that, as prices increase, wages go up and vice versa.57 Conse-
quently, inflation continues to increase while real output per
unit of real input decreases. In effect, the situation might
result to spiraling inflation since rewards and benefits are
provided without compensating increases in productivity.
Comparing United States productivity with other nations in
terms of overall productivity growth, the United States has
constantly fallen behind the growth rate of most industrialized
nations for the past few years. The gap between United States
productivity gains and other nations is noticeable in many in-
stances, with Japan, Denmark, and Belgium achieving roughly
four times the productivity gains of the United States. 58 Bas-
ed upon various economic forecasts and because of different
national productivity growth rates, it is projected that the
United States will continue to be the least productive nation
unless its firms' managers take proper, decisive and prompt





There are national productivity centers in many countries
nowadays. Europe has twenty of these centers; and in Asia there
are fourteen of such centers. One of the most successful na-
tional centers is that of Japan, established in the 1950s du-
ring the period when Japanese manufactured products were gene-
rally considered to be "second rate" and per capital income was
$200 per year. Today, Japan is recognized world-wide as a qua-
lity producer of sophisticated products. Current per capital
income of Japan is $8000 and unemployment rate is only 2 per-
cent. 59
When asked about the secret of Japan's sustained high
growth in productivity, Kohei Goshi, chairman of Japan's pro-
ductivity center, replied:
"The most important reason is the cooperative attitude
between management and labor. That includes our life-time
employment system. Once a person is employed, that person
pretty much stays with the company for a whole working career.
He entrusts his entire life to the corporation. He shares his
prosperity with the company. We in Japan have learned much from
the United States about industrial engineering, but we have
mixed that technique with more emphasis on the human side.
Both United States and Europe need to do that."
Each Japanese plant has its white-collar and blue-collar
Quality Circles in which three to ten employees meet at their
own time to discuss quality and find ways to improve the pro-
59 Ibid., pp. 9 - 10
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ducts they manufacture. The rewards given for usable ideas are
mostly psychological. Whereas General Motors offers employees
up to 10,000 per usable suggestion, a Japanese firm's award of
$600 for a patentable idea is considered generous. In fact, at
Nissan, the maker of Datsun, an original idea is usually award-
ed with a company button or a ball-point pen." Japanese be-
lieve that employees inducement toward productivity improvement
has many important facets other than monetary reward.
Few Japanese auto plants can match American facilities in
terms of both capacity and design. For instance, the Toyota
plant near Nagoya is very noisy, dark, and conjested. The as-
sembly line produces 60 cars per hour as compared to the pace
of 100 plus cars per hour of some United States auto plants. In
most cases Japanese are not only concerned about the cars they
build, but also about the cars they buy. A United States auto
manufacturer was puzzled by the high level of activity that was
reported at one time within the service department of their
dealer located in Tokyo. When the manufacturer sent engineers
to Japan to investigate the issue, these engineers found that
the dealers's service department was engaged in rebuilding the
United States - produced and - imported autos prior to their
being sold rather than performing the pairs after the sale.61
The dealer reported that, from previous experience, his
Japanese customers would not just accept the American-built
cars without extensive rework being performed to raise the qua-
60 Ibid., p. 10
61 Ibid., p. 11 	 105
lity of those cars to Japanese quality standards.
Relationship between the United States and Japan has for
some time being at a flash point due to the increasing number
of cars and other Japanese-manufactured products being imported
into the country. To reduce the growing dissatisfaction resul-
ting from this trade imbalance, the Japanese are now manufac-
turing more of their products in the United States. American
and Japanese executives are mixed and working together as co-
partners. The result is that Japanese management techniques are
being applied to American business, hoping that this will help
in some way to alleviate the dissatisfaction and also increase
United States productivity growth.
At Sony Corporation, where American and Japanese execu-
tives are presently managing a television manufacturing plant,
the chairman of the company has applied a combination of 60
percent Japanese management technique and 40 percent American
to the assembly operations. 62 Sony spent millions of dollars
for new facilities and equipment at this plant. Matsushita Cor-
poration (Quasar) obtained a badly neglected television opera-
tion in Franklin Park, Illinois, from Motorola in 1974 and has
already spent millions to upgrade the equipment and facilities
there. The company is experiencing dificulties in consistently
generating profits, but notwithstanding it has successfully
avoided attempts to unionize the work force. Participative man-




tion is shut down for 15 minutes each Tuesday so that super-
visors can encourage employees to discuss job related issues.
Defects in television sets produced at the facility at the time
the Japanese took over averaged 150 for every 100 completed
sets. Today the average number of defects per 100 sets is 4,
and Consumer Reports consistently ranks Quasar sets the best
regarding frequency of repair. Quasar sets meet United States
quality standards, but its management concedes that they have a
long way yet to go in order to meet Japanese quality
standards 63
The rapid growth of foreign imports over the last few
years has also affected United States productivity growth rate
such that it probably has not reached its full potential. Im-
ports have added to the problem of excess capacity and have
also discouraged American businessmen from investing in new
plant and equipment in many industries. People are now con-
scious about the impact of productivity growth on jobs and em-
ployment opportunites in many United States industries. In
steel, heavy subsides to producers by foreign governments and
dumping of steel by foreign producers in United States markets
have drastically reduced the growth prospects of the American
steel industry. 64 American steel producers are now investing a
large portion of their funds in other industries rather than
reinvesting in steel production.
Research and development spending in the United States has
63 Ibid., p. 12.
64 Jerome M. Rosow, Productivity Prospects for Growth (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 1981), p. 109
107
declined tremendously as a percent of the nation's GNP probably
because the federal government has reduced its commitment in
many respects. Private R & D spending has also been below what
it could because such expenditures are very much affected by
recessions. These expenditures are one of the very first items
to be cut whenever an economy is disrupted by cyclical forces.
During the economic recovery of 1975 to 1979, real R & D spend-
ing by private industries increased by 24 percent, and a strong
economy would continue that trend.
The 1970 and 1974 recessions also hindered United States
productivity growth because each of these recessions caused a
drop in the growth rate. For instance, productivity in manufac-
turing declined by 5.2 percent in 1974, the largest drop since
World War II. 65 During recession consumers reduce their demand
which leaves workers plant, and equipment idle. High overhead
costs are incurred, which also discourage investment that can
increase productivity. The slower operation of business in re-
turn retards the introduction of new plant and equipment that
embodies the latest technology. The best productivity growth in
any economy is achieved when unemployment is falling and
consumer demand is growing strong and steady. As such, business
activities will expand more rapidly and the latest technology
and mechinery can be brought into the workplace more quickly.
In such climate, on-the-job training programs can be developed
and schools and universities may expand programs to train
65
Ibid., pp. 109 - 110
108
workers in the newest skills for expanded job opportunities.
The recession and slow-grow policies of the United States
stem from misguided attempts to cure inflation with unemploy-
ment. The Federal Reserve Board fought inflation in 1970 and
1974 by raising interest rates and this method has continued
over the past few years. However, the inflation of the 1970s
resulted primarily from rising prices of energy, food, housing
and medical care. Therefore the best way to reduce inflation is
to apply corrective policies to these sectors. Raising interest
rates will actually not solve the problems in these sectors,
but will rather make inflation worse by raising the cost of
credit, which is an important cost in any investment decision.
There are prospects for productivity growth in the United
States but these prospects depend fundamentally on the perfor-
mance of the entire economy. If inflation is fought with reces-
sion and slow economic growth, the prospects for productivity
growth are poor. If policies are formulated and put into effect
to attack the specific causes of inflation and other economic




Conclusions and Recommendations 
Productivity is important in achieving the desires of
every industry within any economy. National, business and per-
sonal goals are all fulfilled when greater productivity growth
is accomplished. The concept of productivity recognizes the
interrelationship between various factors in the work place.
While the output, or results achieved, may be related to many
different inputs, or resources, in the form of various produc-
tivity ratios, ie., output per labor hour, output per unit of
materials, or output per unit of capital, each of these separ-
ate productivity ratios is influenced by a combination of many
relevant factors. These influencing factors include the quality
and availability of needed materials, the technique of opera-
tions and the rate of capacity utilization, the availability of
capital equipment, the attitude and skill level of the work
force, and the motivation and effectiveness of the management.
The manner in which these factors interrelate has an important
bearing on the achievement of productivity growth.
Individual groups have different perceptions about produc-
tivity in every nation including the united States. Government
looks at it as the means of reducing deficit and-or accomplish-
ing trade balance; businessmen consider it as the key to reduc-
ing costs and then in return maximize profits, show increases
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in dividends, expand business activities, increase market share
and build strong competitive position both on the domestic and
international levels; labor looks at productivity as the means
of creating more jobs, earning more salaries and improving
standards of living. These perceptions may appear different in
some way, but for the most part they all contain the character-
istics of productivity growth and its essence to national de-
velopment.
Productivity improvement requires national commitment
which includes government, business and individuals. Produc-
tivity growth achievement is most defeated because companies
give lip service to it without much resource commitment. Those
companies in very desperate need, especially when financial
resources are scarce, usually back their plans with shared au-
thority and encouraging innovative actions.
Upper level management support is a very essential criter-
ion to productivity improvement. Creative leadership also plays
an important role in achieving productivity growth because good
leadership creates conducive atmosphere in which improvement
can be accomplished with high satisfaction and at minimum cost.
Productivity affects fical policy, political decisions,
resource shortages and individual consumer spending. If wages
and other employment benefits exceed gains realized from pro-
ductivity, the result is continuous price increases. Companies
are vulnerable to competitive pressures, both at home and
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abroad if productivity growth takes a downward trend. Companies
became strained by drops in productivity growth because more
resources will in effect be utilized to produce less or just
about the same output.
Productivity in the United States was at a remarkable
level after the Industrial Revolution and as such the U.S. was
envied by many nations including Great Britain where the Revo-
lution begun. The high productivity growth rate of the United
States continued even up to, and after World War II because it
was the nation least affected by the war. However, this smooth
trend of growth changed as the United States entered the 1960s.
After several decades of continuous growth, this change seems
to be controversial and unbelievable. Some people regard it as
one that is peculiar to particular industries within the U.S.
economy, while others look at it as one that is affecting every
industry in the United States.
Several factors have contributed to the decline in U.S.
productivity growth rate. Most industrialized nations were
greatly affected by World War II unlike the United States. How-
ever, after the war these nations have been deeply concerned
with rebuilding their economy in order to accelerate growth
rates. Countries like Japan, Russia and other European nations
have committed more of their resources to both national and
international development far more than the United States since
World War II. These nations have therefore grown faster than
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America and have provided more competition in world markets as
well. It seems that the United States spending is escalating
faster than its production rate which in effect is continuously
fostering inflation.
The laot of sufficient attention to investment in the
United States is another factor that has hindered productivity
growth. As the nation entered the 1960s, industries completely
neglected the replacement and modernization of machinery and
equipment. United States industries have found it very diffi-
cult to make reinvestments because of rigorous environmental
regulations. Most of these regulations require certain produc-
tion facilities and safety measures. To meet the standards of
these regulations companies have been constrained by spending
huge amount for safety programs instead of making more invest-
ment. Consequently productivity growth has declined as compared
with other industrialized nations where relatively more re-
sources have been devoted into capital investment.
Government spending in the United States has increased far
beyond the tax base that supports it. This increased spending
is in response to the expectations of citizens which have grown
over the years as politicians continue to make promises in
their struggle to get into power. Originally citizens' expecta-
tions were demands, but they have now became entitlements.
Government continues to respond to these entitlements by formu-
lating more generous services and benefits, which at most is
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done by taking increasing amount of wealth out of the economy
by way of taxes. As the result major emphasis is placed on con-
sumption rather than production, or on redistribution of wealth
rather than how to create or increase wealth.
Productivity growth has also been affected by the sexual
composition of the United States work force since the late
1960s. More women have been employed than before and the vast
majority of these women have actually worked far less than the
average male workers. This together with the large numbers of
teenagers who have entered the job market lately, certainly
represent lower quality human capital.
The job-hopping problem in the United States is one of the
major factors that is affecting productivity growth. There is
no good teamwork, group loyalty, or common interest in raising
any company's productivity because jobs are unstable and emplo-
yees are never sure of one for a long period at least, if not
permanent. Workers keep on moving from one job to another, not
necessarily for better opportunities but at most because of.lay
offs. Workers, including managers, are not willing to make any
sacrifice for the future prosperity of any company because they
are aware of not being around for a long period, especially
when productivity is achieved. Companies in like manner are not
willing to invest in the future development of their employees
because of the fear that these employees will accept employment
elsewhere within a short period of time. Each group is there-
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fore operating in its own interest without national commitment
to productivity growth.
Employees are not encouraged by management to participate
in decision making and as such they have become accustomed to
taking orders rather than being initiative or self starting.
All decisions come from the top with directive for enforcement.
At times the objectives of some decisions may apparently appear
unattainable or at least difficult to attain, but top manage-
ment gets to realize this after wasting much resources. This is
the result of one-way communication with practically little or
no feedback in return. Sometimes employee suggestions are en-
couraged but the job insecurity situation cannot permit workers
to reveal productive ideas.
United States executives are more interested in short-term
profits than long term. Everyone is after quick payoffs or big
quarterly jumps in dividends rather than creating solid market
positions that will be rewarding over the long run. Share-
holders expectations are so high that managers find it diffi-
cult to make any financial sacrifice toward gaining critical
market share. They are not even free enough to do whatever they
consider necessary to strengthen their company's competitive
status over the long run. Consequently, the United States is
finding it difficult to compete with other industrialized na-
tions where managers are free from pressure to show steady in-
creases in earning per share. Besides hardships in competing
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internationally, the zeal for short-term profits is surpressing
incentive for long-term investment. Everyone is after the
",American Dream of Success" which seems almost unlikely to come
through.
There is lack of direct cooperation between government and
business in the united States unlike for instance, in Japan,
where both government and business work closely together for
economic advancement. Most government activities that are busi-
ness related don't give guidance to businessmen on how to suc-
ceed, but rather emphasize on what not to do. There is no form-
al organization coordinating government and business efforts
toward productivity improvement. Therefore efforts are being
applied in opposite direction with practically little or no
achievement in the end.
Management and labor relation is adversarial because each
side has no trust in the other. Therefore there is no common
consensus as to how productivity could be improved. Everyone is
working to achieve his personal growth which is unhealth for
the entire economy.
The labor system in the United States is greatly affecting
productivity growth, but it appears as though both management
and labor leaders have yet to realize the impact of their deci-
sions on the nation's growth rate. Managers are mostly engaged
with labor dispute than productive planning. Strike is the most
powerful tool used by labor unions to reinforce their demands
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which ultimately disrupt economic growth. Unfortunately how-
ever, this system is forever growing in every U.S. industry
probably due to established legislations. Though the situation
appears to be off hand, most managers find it very convenient
working under such atmosphere.
From the facts gathered during this research, it is ap-
parent that United States productivity growth rate took an act-
ual downward trend since the 1960s which has continued up to
the 1980s. Inflation has almost became permanent within every
sector of the economy. Disinflation took place between 1981 and
1985, but that has not actually helped the inflation problem in
any significant way because disinflation entails price in-
creases at slower rate. Disinflation in any case is not the
same as deflation, which the United States economy needs in
order to raise standards of living.
However difficult U.S. productivity growth problem may
appear to be at present, there are prospects for better eco-
nomic advancement even now as well as in the future. Therefore
in the United States quest for solutions to the present eco-
nomic malaise, it is necessary to redirect a vast majority of
available resources toward increased technological productivi-
ty. This will enable organizations to give customers more pro-
duct value per dollar spent; utilize available resources more
effectively; improve operational methods and then realize
greater returns on capital investment. Increased technological
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productivity will also enable companies to compete more effec-
tively on both domestic and international levels. With better
competitive positions in the marketplace, sales volume and pro-
fit margins can be increased simultaneously.
Government and business in the United States should neces-
sarily develop means of coordinating efforts toward greater
productivity achievement. There are significant untapped and
underutilized resources in almost every industry and certainly
enough all U.S. industries have the potential for improvement.
However, this to a large extent requires proper and long-range
planning with total government and business commitments.
The role of employees in productivity improvement is also
important and as such it should be given special attention es-
pecially in the United States, where management and labor prac-
tically lack trust in one another. Labor everywhere sees pro-
ductivity improvement as a threat to job security. For the
United States, managers should develop effective methods of
motivating workers toward company prosperity. Company goals and
individual employee objectives should have a strong correla-
tion; and both management and workers should be motivated in
similar direction. Workers should be given greater autonomy
such that decisions concerning their job performance can be
self determined. Management should be willing to consider em-
ployee participation in productivity gains, whether these gains
are short or long term. These modification in the management
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philosophies will change workers opposition to productivity
improvement into cooperation.
Long-range planning should be given more priority by busi-
ness executives in efforts to increase United States produc-
tivity growth. This is important especially in world competi-
tion where winning greater market share determines companies
survival. Besides, long-range planning improves operational
productivity by helping to ensure the best possible use of re-
sources; integrating all aspects of any particular program into
an efficient unified effort; providing effective guidelines for
evaluating performance, and better preparing for future risks
and contingencies.
The concept of teamwork is an inevitable solution to pro-
ductivity improvement everywhere and the United States is no
exception. Teamwork achieves productivity growth in short per-
iods and at minimum costs because team members work collective-
ly with commitment to goals and objectives. The nature of a
team's organization matters less as compared to the understand-
ing among its members. For instance, the Japanese organize
teams and groups with cultural characteristics to achieve na-
tional goals and objectives. The United States is equally cap-
able of organizing its work force toward greater productivity
achievement, but both management and labor must adapt a new
sense of direction.
The rate of productivity growth in the United States has
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been declining in recent years as this research has shown.
Everyone is affected by this continuous drop in growth rate and
the situation is more or less creating lots of pessimism about
the future success of U.S. economy. The problem is obviously a
national problem and therefore requires a national solution.
Therefore if the United States should overcome its economic
setback and regain its position in world competition, national
commitment is the remedy. This includes individual, business,
and government commitment to all productivity improvement
programs. Prospects for United States economic growth are
bright but total society commitment is a necessity.
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